# How to Back Up a Seed Phrase and Test That It Works

Published 2026-10-22 · Crypto.world Team · Crypto.world

> Write down a recovery phrase as BIP-39 and the wallet makers' own documentation describe, then prove the backup works with the device's own check or a restore, and learn where the words must never be typed.

## In One Minute

- A BIP-39 recovery phrase is 12 to 24 words from a public list of 2,048 (Trezor's 20-word SLIP-39 backups use a list of 1,024). Whoever holds the words controls the wallet, and a wallet maker's support team cannot restore them for you.
- A phrase that looks valid is not a proven backup. The built-in checksum is short, so only a comparison against the real wallet, or a restore, shows that the words are right.
- The test built for the job is the one a hardware wallet runs on itself: the device compares the words with its stored backup and keeps nothing. Newer models take the words on the device; Trezor's Model One has you type them on a computer, so use one you trust. Where no such check exists, restore onto a second device of the same kind.
- The words go on paper or metal. They never go into a photo, a note, a cloud folder or a website, and nobody legitimate asks for them.

## What the Words Encode, and What the Checksum Cannot Catch

A recovery phrase is a human-readable form of a random number. BIP-39, "Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys", was written by Marek Palatinus, Pavol Rusnak, Aaron Voisine and Sean Bowe and assigned on 10 September 2013; its repository lists it as "Deployed". Its recipe: 128 to 256 bits of entropy plus a checksum, cut into groups of 11 bits, each group an index into a list of 2,048 words. The result is 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 words. By their own documentation, Ledger devices use 24 words, MetaMask generates 12, and Trezor's BIP-39 backups are 12 or 24.

The words are not the key itself. The specification runs the sentence through PBKDF2 (2,048 iterations of HMAC-SHA512) to produce a 512-bit seed, and the wallet derives its keys from that seed. Change the optional passphrase and the result is always a different, valid wallet. Change one word or the order and the checksum usually rejects the phrase; when it slips through, the phrase opens a different wallet. Ledger's documentation says any error in spelling or word order generates a different set of addresses. The specification adds that it is "strongly discouraged" to use non-English wordlists, since most BIP-39 wallets support only English.

Formats differ between wallets. Electrum's documentation says it "does not generate BIP39 seeds" and uses its own versioned scheme, while BIP-39's list of shortcomings includes "No versioning scheme": the words alone do not say which address format to derive. Trezor also offers a 20-word SLIP-39 format drawn from a 1,024-word list. Note which wallet made the phrase, and restore it in a wallet that reads that format.

The specification states the checksum's limits itself:

> The checksum is short. This means it only gives modest odds of catching random errors (1-in-256 errors will be missed). It is also not able to provide any assistance in correcting errors. — BIP-39, Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys

The specification's table gives a 4-bit checksum for a 12-word phrase and 8 bits for 24 words, so by the same arithmetic a random mistake would pass about one time in 16 on 12 words. A wallet that accepts a phrase has shown the words are consistent, not that they are the words that created your wallet. The tests below therefore compare against the wallet itself.

## Write It Down: Seven Steps

The steps follow the documentation of Trezor, Ledger and MetaMask; other makers document the same operations.

1. **Begin with a device or wallet you set up yourself.** Ledger states that "A legitimate Ledger device never comes with a recovery phrase or PIN code pre-configured. Ever." A phrase that arrives on a card or in the instructions is not to be used.
2. **Write each word as the device displays it, in order.** Trezor ships wallet backup cards for this and recommends clear handwriting in capital letters; Ledger's recovery sheet has a numbered space for each of 24 words. Trezor says the words must be copied "in the exact order they appear".
3. **Read every word back against the screen.** Ledger advises double-checking each word against what the device shows, and MetaMask asks users to double-check spelling and order. On a 12- or 24-word BIP-39 phrase, a word outside the 2,048-word list is a typo; MetaMask's troubleshooting page sends users to the BIP-39 English list to check spelling. A Trezor 20-word backup uses SLIP-39's own 1,024-word list, so check it against that list, not BIP-39's.
4. **Make no digital copy.** Trezor lists screenshots, photographs, emails, Dropbox and encrypted folders. MetaMask warns against cloud-saved documents and says online storage such as the cloud or password managers is "not secure and vulnerable to hacks".
5. **Store it away from the device and out of sight.** Ledger recommends a location separate from the hardware wallet, and both Ledger and Trezor suggest more than one copy in separate secure locations. Each added copy is another thing to guard. Trezor adds that a hidden home safe can itself draw a thief's interest, and that a bank deposit box may be opened under the bank's own policies.
6. **Decide on metal.** Trezor calls paper "vulnerable to fire, water, and physical damage over time" and recommends metal tools that resist fire, water, pressure and corrosion; Ledger says steel backups resist fire, water damage and other physical threats. A metal plate is still a readable copy of the secret and needs the same hiding place as paper. Both makers' pages name products and others exist; none is recommended here.
7. **Do not split the phrase by hand.** The documentation disagrees. Ledger's Academy lists splitting a phrase into separately stored parts as a method, "if done correctly". Trezor's FAQ says that keeping the first 12 words in one place and the last 12 in another "does not offer the same protection. Each half contains usable information that narrows the search space for an attacker." Its alternative is SLIP-39 multi-share: in a 3-of-5 setup any three shares recover the wallet, and fewer reveal nothing.

## Test the Backup Without Exposing It

The test shows whether these words rebuild this wallet. Run it while the wallet is empty or nearly so, because both Trezor check pages name moving funds to a new wallet as the remedy for a backup that fails.

**Option A: the device's own check.** Trezor's Check backup runs the recovery flow without storing what you enter: the device compares the backup in its memory with the one you type and shows a match or an error. Trezor recommends it before wiping the device and before every firmware update. The labels below are as Trezor's Safe 5 and Model One pages print them in October 2026.

1. Open the Trezor Suite desktop app on a computer you trust, connect the device and enter your PIN. Trezor's own advice is to "use desktop apps for better isolation from internet threats", and that matters most on the Model One, where you type the words on the computer.
2. Go to Device Settings. Under Wallet backup, click Check backup.
3. Tick "I understand" and click Start.
4. Follow the prompts for the PIN and the number of words, in whichever order they appear, and then for the words themselves. The Safe 5 takes them on its touchscreen, with autocomplete suggestions to confirm word by word. On the Model One, choose "Standard recovery"; the device's screen says which word to enter next, and you type it on the computer's keyboard in Suite or pick it from the drop-down menu. Trezor also documents an advanced recovery method for the Model One that keeps the words off the computer: "With the Trezor Model One, you can always use the advanced recovery method to avoid malicious computers." Trezor's page also says: "Model One relies on entering words on your computer for recovery."
5. Read the verdict on the device. The Model One prints "The seed is valid and MATCHES the one in the device"; a wrong word or order gives "The seed is INVALID!" and Suite reports that the check failed, so close it and repeat. Unplugging a Safe 5 mid-check restarts it.

If you cannot produce a correct entry, Trezor's instruction is to move the funds "immediately" to a new wallet with a new backup. A multi-share backup is checked only up to its threshold, so Trezor says the other shares need separate checks.

Ledger publishes a Recovery Check app. Its repository describes an app that invites you to type the seed on the device, compares it with the one onboarded and reports whether they match, and Ledger Academy points to it for confirming that what you wrote matches what protects the device. Follow Ledger's current instructions for your model.

**Option B: restore onto a second or wiped device.** Trezor's recovery guide says that with a new or wiped device you "can restore an existing wallet using your wallet backup". Loading a backup onto a used device means a factory reset first, and Trezor warns that without a valid backup, "losing access to your Trezor will result in permanent loss of your funds". Run the dry run before any wipe, or restore on a spare device and leave the original untouched. After the test, wipe the spare device or keep it under the same protection as the original.

The same guide says: "Do not enter your wallet backup anywhere unless your physical Trezor device instructs you to do so." A hardware wallet's phrase belongs on hardware: Ledger's Academy says never to restore it into a software wallet, because that risks exposing it.

**Option C: software wallets.** On MetaMask's restore page, a fresh install offers "I have an existing wallet" (extension) or "Import using Secret Recovery Phrase" (mobile). The pass condition is that the addresses you expect appear; otherwise, MetaMask says, "you either have the wrong Secret Recovery Phrase" or an account to re-import. Restoring scans accounts in order and stops at the first with zero ETH on Ethereum mainnet, so a later account may need re-adding by hand. The words are typed on a connected machine, so use one you trust and keep up to date.

These tests do not cover the passphrase, each separate copy, or whether anyone saw the words at setup.

## The Passphrase, and the People Who Will Inherit

BIP-39 makes the passphrase optional (Ledger calls it the 25th word); if none is present, an empty string is used, and the passphrase becomes part of the salt. The specification notes that "every passphrase generates a valid seed (and thus a deterministic wallet) but only the correct one will make the desired wallet available". In practice a mistyped passphrase raises no error. Trezor says every passphrase, typos included, opens a different wallet, and that passphrases "cannot be changed, removed, or recovered". Ledger does not store it either: lose it and the hidden accounts become inaccessible.

Keep the passphrase on a separate piece of paper from the phrase. Trezor's FAQ on SLIP-39 wallets says to write the passphrase down and store it separately from the backup, and its passphrase page says to test access regularly by entering the passphrase and opening the wallet.

For heirs, Trezor's backup guide (8 January 2025) lists "Plan for inheritance" and suggests a legal advisor or making sure heirs understand how to reach the backup securely. Ledger's inheritance guide (published December 2025, updated 16 October 2026) adds that heirs need the passphrase too and that a safe deposit box can mean court orders that "can take months". It also describes an executor who downloads a phishing "wallet" and loses everything. Instructions should say what the words are, where they are kept, and where they must never be typed.

## Where the Phrase Never Goes, and the Scams That Ask for It

No legitimate party asks for the phrase. Trezor: "We will never ask you for your wallet backup, even if you are speaking with our customer support." MetaMask: "We will never ask you to provide your SRP", and it names two situations where typing it is expected, creating a wallet and restoring one, both of which scammers imitate. Ledger says a genuine Ledger signer "never asks you to enter your recovery phrase on a computer, phone, app, or website"; Trezor says: "Never enter your wallet backup anywhere unless prompted by your Trezor device."

Three dated cases show how scammers try.

**A wallet-connect prompt.** On 3 June 2025 the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (alert I-060325-PSA) described unsolicited airdrops to Hedera wallet users whose memo carried a link; the connection step "often requires the user to input their login and security information, including seed phrases". Its advice:

> Do not respond to requests to provide personally identifying information, like passwords, seed phrases, or one-time passwords sent to your accounts if you did not initiate the outreach. — Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Public Service Announcement I-060325-PSA, 3 June 2025

**A "verification" request.** Trezor's scam page calls any request for a wallet backup, PIN, passwords or codes "always a scam", treats every message urging you to "verify your backup" as phishing, and lists text messages, WhatsApp, Telegram, phone calls and postal letters as channels it does not use. BleepingComputer reported on 14 February 2026 that mailed letters imitating Trezor and Ledger carried QR codes, and that the Trezor-themed page asked for a 24-, 20- or 12-word phrase.

**A tampered device.** Ledger's blog of 15 October 2026 says a criminal group "fitted custom-built hidden components designed to capture the recovery phrase during setup" to genuine devices and returned them to distribution through resellers in South East Asia; Ledger says its own chip, operating system and servers were not compromised. Its buying guide says the Genuine Check cannot detect such physical modifications while the original Secure Element is intact.

A restore test proves the words rebuild the wallet; it cannot show that nobody else saw them. Trezor's remedy for a doubtful backup is to move the funds to a new wallet with a new backup.

For buyers from the affected reseller, BleepingComputer quoted Ledger on 12 October 2026: "If you have set up your Ledger device, consider moving assets to a new Ledger signer (with a new seed)". Ledger also advised not starting setup on a device from that reseller that is still unused. A new phrase generated on the same suspect device could be captured the same way, so the new device is part of the remedy.

You start a backup check yourself, from the wallet's own settings or app; a check started for you by a link, a QR code or a caller is a scam.

## Checks to Repeat

1. Before any wipe or firmware update, run the device's check (Trezor). Electrum's FAQ adds a warning to save the seed on paper before an upgrade.
2. Look at the paper or metal on a schedule you set; Trezor advises checking for fading, wear and damage.
3. Enter the passphrase and confirm it opens the wallet you expect.
4. Re-read the heirs' instructions after any change of wallet, storage place or passphrase.
5. After any scare in which the words may have been seen (you typed them somewhere, scanned a code and followed it, or the device is suspect), assume they were, and move the funds to a new wallet with a new phrase, on a new device if the device itself is in doubt.

BIP-39 has been assigned since 10 September 2013. Its text and 2,048-word list are at github.com/bitcoin/bips, where any wallet's claims can be checked against them.

## Sources

1. [BIP-39: Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys (bitcoin/bips)](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki) github.com
2. [BIP-39 English wordlist, 2,048 words (bitcoin/bips)](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039/english.txt) github.com
3. [FBI IC3 Public Service Announcement I-060325-PSA, 3 June 2025](https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2025/PSA250603) ic3.gov
4. [Ledger: Ledger's Response to the Hardware Implant Attack, 15 October 2026](https://www.ledger.com/blog-response-hardware-implant-attack) ledger.com
5. [Trezor: How to use a wallet backup](https://trezor.io/guides/backups-recovery/general-standards/how-to-use-a-wallet-backup) trezor.io
6. [Trezor: Check wallet backup on Trezor Safe 5](https://trezor.io/guides/backups-recovery/general-standards/check-backup-on-trezor-safe-5) trezor.io
7. [Trezor: Check wallet backup on Model One](https://trezor.io/guides/backups-recovery/general-standards/check-wallet-backup-on-model-one) trezor.io
8. [Trezor: Recover wallet on Trezor Safe 3](https://trezor.io/guides/backups-recovery/general-standards/recover-wallet-on-trezor-safe-3) trezor.io
9. [Trezor: What is a passphrase?](https://trezor.io/guides/backups-recovery/advanced-wallets/what-is-a-passphrase) trezor.io
10. [Trezor: Understanding Trezor wallet backups: 12, 20 or 24 words](https://trezor.io/learn/security-privacy/personal-security-standards/understanding-trezor-wallet-backups-12-20-or-24-words) trezor.io
11. [Trezor: SLIP39 FAQs](https://trezor.io/guides/backups-recovery/general-standards/slip39-faqs) trezor.io
12. [Trezor Blog: Best practices for securing your wallet backup, 8 January 2025](https://trezor.io/blog/security/best-practices-for-securing-your-wallet-backup) trezor.io
13. [Trezor: Scams and phishing](https://trezor.io/learn/security-privacy/personal-security-standards/scams-and-phishing) trezor.io
14. [Ledger Academy: What Is a Seed Phrase?](https://www.ledger.com/academy/basic-basics/2-how-to-own-crypto/whats-a-secret-recovery-phrase) ledger.com
15. [Ledger Academy: How to Keep Your Seed Phrase Secure](https://www.ledger.com/academy/hardwarewallet/best-ways-to-protect-your-recovery-phrase) ledger.com
16. [Ledger Academy: Recovery Sheet](https://www.ledger.com/academy/glossary/recovery-sheet) ledger.com
17. [Ledger Academy: Passphrase](https://www.ledger.com/academy/passphrase-an-advanced-security-feature) ledger.com
18. [Ledger (LedgerHQ/app-recovery-check): Ledger device app to check seed backup](https://github.com/LedgerHQ/app-recovery-check) github.com
19. [Ledger Academy: What Happens to Your Crypto When You Die](https://www.ledger.com/academy/topics/crypto/what-happens-to-your-crypto-when-you-die-the-complete-guide) ledger.com
20. [Ledger Academy: Best Practices To Securely Buy Your Ledger Signer](https://www.ledger.com/academy/topics/ledgersolutions/best-practices-to-securely-buy-ledger-signer) ledger.com
21. [MetaMask Help Center: How to secure your Secret Recovery Phrase and password](https://support.metamask.io/start/user-guide-secret-recovery-phrase-password-and-private-keys/) support.metamask.io
22. [MetaMask Help Center: Basic security tips for MetaMask users](https://support.metamask.io/stay-safe/safety-in-web3/basic-safety-and-security-tips-for-metamask) support.metamask.io
23. [MetaMask Help Center: How to restore your wallet using your Secret Recovery Phrase](https://support.metamask.io/configure/wallet/how-to-restore-your-metamask-wallet-from-secret-recovery-phrase/) support.metamask.io
24. [MetaMask Help Center: How to fix 'Invalid Seed Phrase' error](https://support.metamask.io/configure/troubleshooting/how-to-fix-invalid-seed-phrase-error-invalid-secret-recovery-phrase/) support.metamask.io
25. [Electrum documentation: Electrum Seed Version System](https://electrum.readthedocs.io/en/latest/seedphrase.html) electrum.readthedocs.io
26. [Electrum documentation: Frequently Asked Questions](https://electrum.readthedocs.io/en/latest/faq.html) electrum.readthedocs.io
27. [BleepingComputer: Snail mail letters target Trezor and Ledger users in crypto-theft attacks, 14 February 2026](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/snail-mail-letters-target-trezor-and-ledger-users-in-crypto-theft-attacks/) bleepingcomputer.com
28. [Cointelegraph: Fake Trezor, Ledger Letters Target Crypto Wallet Users](https://cointelegraph.com/news/scammers-send-physical-letters-trezor-ledger-users-again) cointelegraph.com
29. [BleepingComputer: Ledger confirms spy chip implant behind wallet crypto thefts, 12 October 2026](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ledger-confirms-hardware-wallet-spy-implant-behind-crypto-thefts/) bleepingcomputer.com
30. [Trezor: Security threats to crypto wallets and how Trezor defends against them](https://trezor.io/learn/security-privacy/personal-security-standards/security-threats-to-crypto-wallets-and-how-trezor-defends-against-them) trezor.io
31. [Trezor: Phishing attacks and how to keep your crypto safe](https://trezor.io/blog/security/phishing-attacks-and-how-to-keep-your-crypto-safe) trezor.io

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