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Aave Liquidations Under Stress: Where DeFi Lending Actually Broke

Aave's liquidation engine cleared hundreds of millions of dollars in two crashes with small deficits. DeFi lending lost money where the price fed to it was wrong: a dollar token priced at fundamental…

Aave Liquidations Under Stress: Where DeFi Lending Actually Broke

Liquidation Engines, Price Inputs and Who Chooses Them

Every DeFi lending market rests on three parts that matter when prices fall. A liquidation engine lets anyone repay an unhealthy loan and take its collateral at a discount. A price input tells the engine what that collateral is worth. Someone chose that input, under rules that differ from one protocol to the next.

The dated record of four stress events, from October 2025 to March 2026, shows which part gave way. Aave's engine cleared about $180 million of liquidations onchain in the crash of 10 October 2025, by Chaos Labs' count published the next day, and $429 million in the selloff of 31 January to 5 February 2026, by Aave Labs' count. The deficits it left ran to hundreds of thousands of dollars in the first case and tens of thousands in the second.

The larger losses came where the price fed to the engine was wrong. In November 2025 it was Elixir's deUSD, a dollar token that lending markets priced, wholly or in part, from "fundamental" values rather than market prices while it collapsed. On 10 March 2026 it was Aave's own exchange-rate cap for wstETH, misconfigured. In both cases the fault lay in the choice of price rather than in the liquidation engine, and who paid depended on who had made that choice.

Event Price the engine read Engine result Loss, as recorded Absorbed by
Crash, 10 Oct 2025 (Aave) Market feeds, some 5 blocks late ~$180M liquidated onchain ~$400K deficit; ~$500K with expected Aave, net profit ~$1.5M
Selloff, 31 Jan–5 Feb 2026 (Aave) Market feeds, no persistent mispricing $429M, ~12,500 transactions ~$30K, one BAL position Aave
deUSD, Nov 2025 (Compound, Morpho) "Fundamental" values Compound paused, then liquidated; Morpho vault wrote market off MEV Capital vault: nearly 3.6% of TVL Compound reserves; vault depositors
wstETH cap, 10 Mar 2026 (Aave) Exchange rate capped ~2.85% low ~10,938 wstETH liquidated, 34 accounts No bad debt; ~512 ETH to liquidators Aave DAO, 512.19 WETH refunded

A Morpho market "pairs one collateral asset with one loan asset", and the collateral counts at its amount times the price returned by the market's oracle. When a position's loan-to-value passes the market's liquidation loan-to-value (LLTV), "any external party" can repay part or all of the debt and take collateral plus a bonus, about 5% at an 86% LLTV. The engine takes the oracle's number as given.

Who picks that number differs. Morpho markets are "immutable (cannot be changed after deployment)", and anyone can create one. Of the five parameters, only the LLTV and the interest-rate model "must be chosen from a set of options approved by Morpho Governance". The oracle, the "Smart contract address pricing the collateral against the loan asset", is the creator's call: Morpho "takes an oracle-agnostic approach, allowing market creators to choose appropriate price feed mechanisms". Curators, independent teams "not part of Morpho", then choose which markets their vaults lend into.

Aave works the other way round. "The oracle for each reserve is selected through Aave Governance", its documentation says, and the DAO sets loan-to-value ratios and liquidation thresholds. In Aave V3, as Aave Labs described it in December 2025, a position with a health factor below 1 can be liquidated for up to half its debt, or all of it below 0.95, for a fixed bonus. Between votes, Risk Stewards, DAO-owned contracts that service providers operate within set limits, adjust parameters. Governance "owns every steward and can revoke it at any time".

10 October 2025: The Engine Under a Crash

Chaos Labs, which managed Aave's risk parameters at the time, posted its first account at 02:42 UTC on 11 October, after a drawdown it tied to new US tariffs on Chinese imports. Total onchain liquidation volume "reached approximately $180 million", concentrated in BTC, ETH and wstETH markets, and produced about $10 million in liquidation bonuses, $1 million of it paid to the DAO treasury as fees. Chaos Labs put Aave's result at an estimated net profit of $1.5 million.

The losses were small and specific. "As of writing", about $400,000 of deficit was outstanding, and about $500,000 counting expected bad debt. Most of it came from CRV and ENS debt positions: with thin onchain liquidity, an entity could borrow those tokens against ETH collateral while "the price oracle had not updated sufficiently relative to onchain prices". Chaos Labs also found updates "delayed by 5 blocks for some markets" on Chainlink SVR feeds, which let Aave recapture part of liquidation MEV; prices rebounded, so the lag added no losses.

Aave Labs' post of 6 February 2026 gives a different figure: "more than $250 million was liquidated on the day". It adds that Aave processed "$1.7 billion in stablecoin withdrawals while $700 million of USDC and USDT in liquidity remained available throughout the event". The two counts come from different authors and windows: a risk provider's tally posted within hours, and Aave Labs' figure for the whole day, published four months later. Neither corrects the other; they should not be added or averaged.

31 January to 5 February 2026: Aave's Largest Liquidation Event

Aave Labs counts the selloff that began on 31 January 2026 as its largest liquidation event in dollar terms: "$429 million in volume (breaking the previous record from May 2021) across ~12,500 transactions". Chaos Labs' report of 2 February found one material deficit, "a ~$30k realized shortfall from a BAL-related position". BAL had fallen 60% in two hours after the liquidation of the holder of most BAL collateral across lending markets.

The price inputs held. Chaos Labs' update of 7 February reported that "no evidence was observed of prolonged staleness, persistent mispricing, or update failure modes that would impair liquidation execution at the protocol level". Market depth was the strain: an account holding about 2% of AAVE's supply as collateral was liquidated in small slices until Wintermute took one much larger liquidation.

November 2025: A "Fundamental" Price While the Market Fell

Elixir described deUSD as "a yield bearing and fully collateralized decentralized dollar". By its own account on 6 November 2025, Stream Finance held "roughly 90% of the deUSD supply (~$75m)", and Elixir held a similar share of the token's remaining backing "as a Morpho loan to Stream". Elixir switched off minting and redemption, snapshotted holders for USDC claims and said it would sunset deUSD. For the loans themselves, its notice read:

Given that Stream comprised of 99%+ of the lending positions (and has decided to not repay or close positions), we will work with Euler, Morpho, Compound and the curators moving forward to help distribute repayment of the Stream loan to liquidate these positions. — Elixir, statement on X, 6 November 2025

On Compound, deUSD and its staked form, sdeUSD, were collateral in the USDC, USDS and USDT markets on Ethereum. Gauntlet, which recommends Compound's risk parameters, had proposed zero supply caps on 28 October, citing "recent concerns regarding the backing of deUSD".

On 4 November it recommended an emergency pause on withdrawals and new borrowing in all three markets. It cited a liquidity crunch in deUSD and sdeUSD while its risk-parameter changes had yet to pass governance. It added the price input: sdeUSD had fallen to $0.86 while the oracle still showed $1.06, so users could borrow "much above the current market rate", which "is considered a vulnerability".

Gauntlet later explained that "The sdeUSD to deUSD is a fundamental oracle". Once deUSD's dollar price broke, positions were liquidated by Compound's automated mechanism. The shortfall landed in Compound's reserves, which were topped up with USDT from Compound V2 reserves by 13 November.

On Morpho, the sdeUSD/USDC market that MEV Capital's USDC vault had lent into, with a 91.5% LLTV, priced its collateral from two inputs. One was the exchange rate of Elixir's staked-deUSD vault. The other was a RedStone feed whose verified implementation is named "EthereumPriceFeedDeusdFundamentalWithoutRoundsV1". Neither is a market price. On 12 November, MEV Capital said the vault had removed the sdeUSD/USDC market, "resulting in the vault realizing a bad debt equal to nearly 3.6% of the total vault TVL at the time".

A curator had described the trade-off in August 2025. Telos Consilium (TelosC), which curates lending vaults, wrote that hardcoded pricing "assigns a fixed value to a stablecoin (typically $1) or ERC-4626 vault token, regardless of market or redemption conditions". If "the stablecoin depegs or redemptions are halted, this approach can dramatically overstate collateral value". Pricing at an issuer's redemption rate, it added, "may diverge from observable market prices during stress events, particularly if redemptions are paused". Redemptions were what Elixir had switched off.

10 March 2026: Aave's Own Oracle, Misconfigured

Aave prices wstETH through CAPO, which caps how fast a yield-bearing token's exchange rate may rise against its base asset. The cap comes from a snapshot ratio, a snapshot timestamp and a maximum yearly growth rate. On 10 March, an update set the timestamp to a point seven days earlier, but the ratio, which can rise only 3% every three days, went from about 1.1572 to 1.1919 instead of the targeted 1.2282. The resulting cap, about 1.1939, sat below the live rate, and the price the protocol used fell about 2.85%.

Positions in E-Mode with a health factor below 1.0288 became liquidatable. About 10,938 wstETH was liquidated across 34 accounts, about $26 million by Chaos Labs' count, with "no bad debt accrued by the protocol". Liquidators captured about 382 ETH from the underpricing and about 512 ETH including bonuses. Chaos Labs traced the root cause to "differing update constraints at the smart contract level": the ratio was rate-limited, and the timestamp was not.

Chaos Labs cut the wstETH borrow cap to 1 on the Core and Prime instances and realigned the snapshot "through manual Risk Steward intervention". Aave recaptured 141.5 ETH of liquidation bonus through BuilderNet refunds, and Chaos Labs put the remaining cost to the DAO at "no more than 358 ETH". Two days later, answering delegates, it accepted the responsibility:

Regardless of where the root cause sits across the system's components, we operated the oracle that produced the update, and we accept the responsibility that comes with it. — Chaos Labs, reply to delegates on the post-mortem, Aave governance forum

LlamaRisk, Aave's other risk provider, added on 16 March that this was "the first update pushed by the CAPO Risk Agent", a newly deployed automated system. The failure, it wrote, "was deterministic and reproducible, the type of issue that pre-execution simulation is specifically designed to catch". "We can observe what lands onchain, but we cannot audit what generates it," LlamaRisk added, and it asked to co-sign Risk Steward operations.

Who Chooses the Price, and Who Pays When It Is Wrong

In Aave's model, governance chooses the price and also decides who pays when it is wrong. TokenLogic's reimbursement proposal of 11 March stated that "The affected users bear no responsibility for these liquidations, which were the direct result of a protocol-level configuration error." It set a 513.19 ETH allowance and a net cost of 358.56 ETH after recoveries; 41.62 WETH that BGD Labs recovered from a searcher brought that to 316.94 WETH the next day.

Onchain, Aave's Collector sent 513.19 WETH to the Aave Finance Committee's multisig on 26 March. The committee paid out 512.19 WETH to 35 addresses in one transaction the next day. Delegates had asked whether Chaos Labs should share the cost; the refund came from the treasury. Bad debt on Aave's Core market would first fall on Umbrella, a fund that Aave Labs said in February 2026 held "over $250 million in staked assets", with the treasury as "a secondary reserve".

On 6 April 2026, Chaos Labs announced it was leaving Aave, citing "a fundamental misalignment on how risk should be managed at Aave". Its offboarding plan rotated the two-of-two Risk Steward multisig "from Chaos Labs and BGD to Aave Labs and LlamaRisk" and turned off its risk oracles for caps, rates and PT prices. As of October 2026, Aave's documentation names LlamaRisk as the risk service provider, operating the manual Risk Steward "together with Aave Labs". CAPO snapshot refreshes now come as LlamaRisk proposals, listing each reserve's old and new values.

On Compound, the risk manager acted through governance, and the protocol's reserves took the loss. On 11 February 2026, Elixir agreed with the Compound Foundation to pay about $11.65 million, which, with $690,000 from Gauntlet's Compound insurance fund, "represented a recovery of approximately 78% for Compound Protocol". By the Foundation's account of 19 April, Elixir missed the 16 March deadline; on 16 April, its counsel notified the Foundation that Elixir was "purporting to rescind the Agreement" and had entered voluntary liquidation in the British Virgin Islands. The Foundation disputes the rescission.

On Morpho, the curator decides and the vault's depositors carry the outcome. Merlin Egalité wrote on Morpho's blog in June 2026 that isolated markets with dedicated curators put "specialists accountable for their own slice". Morpho's documentation says a forced market removal makes a vault "abandon any assets still allocated to the market"; for its first vault version it adds, "The lost assets will be socialized among all vault users immediately."

When a depositor asked on Morpho's forum about recovering the loss, a moderator replied on 14 November that "the Morpho governance is not engaged in such development" and pointed to MEV Capital. MEV Capital said it was "currently working with relevant parties to address the situation on Elixir creditors as it evolves". Elixir's 1-1 USDC claims, by its own terms, were for "deUSD or sdeUSD holders", including LPs who "supplied sdeUSD/deUSD collateral on lend/borrow platforms".

Where the Losses Came From, and What the EU Is Asking

Across the four records, the engines ran, and their residual deficits came from thin long-tail markets and lagging prices. The larger losses came from the input: a price taken from "fundamental" values rather than the market, and a cap computed from parameters that drifted apart. What differed was who answered for it: a DAO treasury within weeks, a protocol's reserves pending legal remedies, or depositors through a vault's share price.

The European Commission is now asking where that answer should sit. The EU's MiCA regulation states that it "should not address the lending and borrowing of crypto-assets", and asks the Commission to assess "the necessity and feasibility of regulating lending and borrowing of crypto-assets". The Commission's consultation for its review, open from 20 May to 30 September 2026, put the question directly: "Do you think that lending and borrowing of crypto‑assets should be regulated?"

It also asked whether crypto-asset service providers that connect clients to DeFi applications "should be liable for certain types of incidents". The answers feed a report the regulation requires, which must include "an assessment of the development of decentralised finance in markets in crypto-assets". The Commission is due to present it by 30 June 2027.

Sources

  1. Chaos Labs, Risk Report: Insights from Recent Market Events - 10/11/25, Aave governance forum (11 October 2025) governance.aave.com
  2. Aave Labs, How Aave Liquidations Perform Under Volatile Conditions (6 February 2026) aave.com
  3. Chaos Labs, Risk Report: Insights from Recent Market Events - 02/02/26, with update of 7 February 2026, Aave governance forum governance.aave.com
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