The Ledger
Aave Labs Backs Babylon’s Native Bitcoin Collateral Plan
Aave Labs says it supports Babylon’s proposal to let users borrow against Bitcoin held in Trustless Bitcoin Vaults on Aave V4. The plan remains in community review, with risk parameters and security work still outstanding.

Aave Labs backed Babylon Labs’ proposal to use native Bitcoin as collateral on Aave V4 in a governance-forum reply on October 22, while saying security reviews are still underway. The proposal would let borrowers lock BTC in Taproot vaults on Bitcoin and borrow stablecoins through Aave without wrapping the coins or placing them with a custodian. It has not been approved for launch: the next steps listed in the proposal are community feedback and risk analysis, followed by a Snapshot vote and an on-chain Aave Improvement Proposal.
Aave Labs endorses the integration, not a launch
Aave Labs said its review found the integration works with Aave V4 and preserves the trust assumptions of the protocol’s standard Spoke design. “This review confirmed that it works as intended with Aave V4, preserves the trust assumptions of the canonical Spoke, includes the security and risk levers that the Aave Protocol and a use case of this sophistication require, and meets Aave quality standards,” the company wrote in its October 22 reply. It said it defers to risk provider LlamaRisk on the parameters that would govern the proposed markets.
The plan would add two V4 Spokes: a Babylon Spoke for borrowing against native BTC and a BTC Vault Swap Spoke for handling liquidations. Aave DAO would set the listed assets, caps, interest-rate strategy, liquidation settings and oracle configuration. The proposal does not provide final risk parameters; it says risk service providers will supply them before the later approval stages.
Bitcoin stays on Bitcoin; the Aave record is restricted
Borrowers would lock BTC in a Taproot output on Bitcoin, with its movement restricted by pre-authorized spending conditions. A corresponding record on Ethereum would represent the vault inside Aave. Because V4 accepts ERC-20 collateral, the integration uses a transfer-restricted ERC-20 accounting token, but the proposal says it cannot be traded, transferred between users or held outside the integration. It is not a freely circulating wrapped-Bitcoin token.
Vault redemption depends on an event on Ethereum, such as repayment or liquidation, and a zero-knowledge proof that can be challenged during a fraud-proof window. The proposal says settlement back to Bitcoin takes multiple days because of that challenge period. Users can operate their own vault provider, but the design also relies on vault providers, application keepers and universal challengers to coordinate vault creation, claims and challenges.
Liquidators get WBTC before the vault is redeemed
The gap between fast Aave liquidations and slower Bitcoin settlement shapes the second Spoke. A permissionless liquidator would receive wrapped BTC in exchange for a seized vault; the proposed launch asset is WBTC, borrowed from an Aave V4 Hub and held against the vault in escrow. An arbitrageur can later repay that debt and redeem the BTC on Bitcoin.
The arrangement creates a risk separate from the borrower’s collateral position: if the escrowed vault is worth less than the WBTC debt, the shortfall is reported to the Hub as a deficit. The proposal also says liquidation takes whole vaults rather than fractions. If the borrower’s debt is repaid before the seized vault is fully consumed, the borrower receives the remainder in discounted WBTC instead of native BTC.
Control and audits remain under discussion
Forum discussion has focused on who can pause the vault system and what that means for withdrawals. In an October 16 reply, a Babylon Labs solution engineer said two multisigs can pause and unpause the Trustless Bitcoin Vault contracts immediately; while paused, users cannot withdraw or redeem, although the collateral remains locked and continues to back Aave debt. The reply said contract upgrades and configuration changes face a five-day timelock, and that final multisig and contract addresses would be included in a later AIP.
Aave Labs says it is reviewing the integration through two internal rounds, an independent researcher’s review and a Certora review using formal verification; it will share reports when the work is complete. Babylon’s proposal separately lists audits across five system components and says it is re-auditing finalized changes before mainnet deployment. The current forum post remains an ARFC for discussion, not a vote authorizing deployment, and the proposal’s own sequence still places risk analysis and governance votes ahead of an on-chain approval.
Sources
- Original source Aave Governance Forum governance.aave.com