# UpdradeTrail Decodes Three RISK_ADMIN_ROLE Grants on Aave V3 Ethereum

Published 2026-11-09 · Crypto.world Team · Crypto.world

> An Aave forum post dated 2026-11-09 decodes three RISK_ADMIN_ROLE grants on Aave V3 Ethereum since 2 September 2026. It says the governance Executor sent all three, including the 30 Sep grant to the verified RiskSteward contract.

## Three RISK_ADMIN_ROLE grants since 2 September 2026

UpdradeTrail posted a factual decode of ACLManager role activity on [Aave](https://governance.aave.com/t/aclmanager-risk-admin-role-grants-sep-2026-decoded/26139) V3 Ethereum on 2026-11-09. The post records three RISK_ADMIN_ROLE grants since 2 September 2026. Two went to 0xbe28…7744 and 0x529e…F6c5 in the same transaction on 2 September 2026, at block 25891729.

## RiskSteward received the 30 Sep grant

At block 26089561 on 30 Sep 2026, the role was granted to 0x6f48d9cdb8ee6e17c96b2d8aec128af426a295c1. The recipient is a verified contract named RiskSteward, with 20,061 bytes of deployed code. UpdradeTrail says all three grants were sent by 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A, which the post identifies as the governance Executor.

## What RISK_ADMIN_ROLE can change

UpdradeTrail says the grants passed governance rather than originating from a standalone admin key. RISK_ADMIN_ROLE can change supply and borrow caps, LTVs, liquidation thresholds and reserve configuration without a full governance vote. The post says routing the role through a RiskSteward contract constrains what its holder may change, while each grant widens the set of actors able to move risk parameters between votes.

## The decode’s method and questions

UpdradeTrail says the decode is from ACLManager’s RoleGranted logs plus the role constants read off the contract itself. UpdradeTrail says they have not diffed storage layouts or reviewed the RiskSteward contract’s internal constraints, and makes no claim about what that specific steward is or is not able to do. UpdradeTrail writes that the ARFC “Activate Aave Risk Stewards on Aave V4” thread is now closed with AIP #523 executed and says they are posting separately rather than reverting that thread. The post asks whether the 30 Sep grant is part of the V4 Risk Steward rollout or a separate V3 steward deployment, and whether the intended steady state is one steward contract or several.

## Sources

1. Original source [Aave Governance Forum](https://governance.aave.com/t/aclmanager-risk-admin-role-grants-sep-2026-decoded/26139) governance.aave.com

## Companies in this story

- [Aave Labs](https://crypto.world/companies/aave-labs)

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