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Avalanche Safe’s $7.45M Drain Began With an Unclaimed Address

A Safe multisig on Avalanche faced a $7.45 million drain after an old, unlimited approval pointed to an address with no code on the chain. An MEV bot took the assets before the attacker and returned most of them after the Safe’s owners agreed to a 42,500 WAVAX bounty.

Avalanche Safe’s $7.45M Drain Began With an Unclaimed Address

A seven-month-old approval exposed $7.45 million

A Safe multisig on Avalanche faced a $7.45 million drain on October 26 after an unlimited token approval, signed in March, gave spending rights to an address with no contract code on the chain. The 2-of-7 wallet held trading assets; the approved address was used for the operator’s pool contract on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum, but remained empty on Avalanche. SigIntZero’s reconstruction says the approval had sat unrevoked for 233 days.

The Safe’s batch transaction on March 7 approved four tokens—WAVAX, USDC, WETH.e and BTC.b—to the same address. Because that address had no code on Avalanche, it could not initially use the approvals. But the address was not reserved: someone could deploy a contract there if they controlled the deployment sequence that generated it.

“Nothing about the bytecode or the chain enters the hash,” writes Aron Turner, co-founder and CTO of SigIntZero, describing how the CREATE opcode derives a contract address from its deployer and nonce. If the same deployer reaches the same nonce on another chain, it can generate the same address there, even if that address is still unused on Avalanche.

“Nothing about the bytecode or the chain enters the hash.”

Aron Turner, co-founder and CTO of SigIntZero

Thirteen deployments put a sweeper at the approved address

SigIntZero says the address matched the 13th contract created by Safe’s CreateCall helper, which can deploy caller-supplied bytecode. On October 26, an attacker installed CreateCall on Avalanche, made twelve throwaway deployments and placed a sweeper contract at the approved address. The sweeper then called transferFrom against the Safe’s four token balances.

The attacker’s transaction did not take the funds. An MEV bot copied the operation and executed first in the same block, taking 3,090,123.58 USDC, 350,375.855 WAVAX, 181.976 WETH.e and 10.786059 BTC.b, according to the transaction reconstruction published by SigIntZero and BlockintAI. The attacker’s later transaction reverted because the bot had already deployed the contract at the target address.

The operation did not require a Safe signature at the time of the drain: the authorization already existed in the March approvals. SigIntZero says the public record it reviewed did not point to a stolen key or phished signer. The operator was not publicly named in the report, which said the team had not published a postmortem as of October 28.

The bot returned most of the funds for 42,500 WAVAX

After taking the assets, the bot moved them to a holding wallet and negotiated with the Safe’s owners through on-chain messages. On October 27, an owner address confirmed an agreement allowing the bot to keep 42,500 WAVAX as a bounty. The holding wallet then returned the USDC, WETH.e and BTC.b, along with 307,834.855 WAVAX.

BlockintAI put the amount returned at about $7.08 million, which is its own subtraction of the roughly $371,000 bounty from the $7.45 million total, using Defimon’s figures. The bot retained 42,500 WAVAX under the agreement, worth about $371,000 at the quoted valuation. It also kept 41 additional WAVAX that did not reach the holding wallet, leaving the returned WAVAX short of the amount taken.

BlockintAI also documented fake token transfers to an address resembling the Safe’s real return address. The lookalike appeared in the holding wallet’s transaction history, creating a risk for anyone who copied an address from recent transfers instead of checking the verified destination.

The risk sat in the approvals, not the pool code

The address-generation process made the stale approval claimable, but the exposure began when the Safe approved a spender that had no code on Avalanche. The funds moved only after someone installed the helper, advanced its deployment nonce and placed a sweeper at the matching address. A contract audit of the pool on other chains would not, by itself, examine that Safe transaction or catch the empty spender on Avalanche.

SigIntZero’s account says the operator’s other-chain Safes were moved to a fresh address after the incident, while the Safe’s unlimited approvals on Avalanche were still in place as of October 27. BlockintAI reported that code now sits at the once-empty address and reverts on every call. The immediate drain was largely reversed, but the approval record remained a separate item for the operator to revoke.

Sources

  1. Original source · Blog post SigIntZero sigintzero.com

Other pages read

  1. BlockintAI blockint.ai

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