# Blockaid Says $1B Aave Flows Escaped Balance-Based AML Checks

Published 2026-10-22 · Crypto.world Team · Crypto.world

> Blockaid says an attacker routed more than $1 billion through Aave V3 flash loans to finance a September 6, 2026, exploit on Balancer V1. The company argues that balance snapshots can miss funds that move through DeFi markets and leave before checks run.

> “Sophisticated actors leave flow evidence rather than balances.”
>
> Gal Arad Cohen and Roni Sidi, authors of Blockaid’s blog post

Blockaid says a September exploit moved more than $1 billion through Aave markets without leaving the attacker with a lasting position for standard balance checks to detect. In a post published October 22, the security company argues that compliance programs focused on who holds funds at a particular moment can miss value that passes through a DeFi market and leaves within a transaction.

The example is a September 6 attack on Balancer V1. Blockaid presents the incident as evidence of a monitoring gap, while warning that the same transaction pattern could pose money-laundering or sanctions concerns if the actor were a designated entity rather than an exploiter.

## How the Balancer attack used Aave

According to Blockaid, the attacker drained roughly $250,000 from Balancer V1, a deprecated version of the protocol. The attacker first borrowed more than $1 billion in assets through flash loans, routed the funds through three Aave V3 markets as collateral, and borrowed another $788 million against them.

The attacker then executed the Balancer exploit and returned the borrowed funds before the transactions ended. Aave itself suffered no loss, Blockaid says; its markets served as the financing layer for an attack carried out on Balancer.

Blockaid says it flagged the attacker’s address hours before the exploit because its funding traced back to Tornado Cash. The company also says it tracked the stolen funds through swaps and back into the mixer, while a customer monitoring one of the affected Aave markets received an alert when stolen-funds exposure crossed its preset threshold. Blockaid says its platform opened an incident and directed the customer to avoid trading against the contaminated market or exit its position.

## Why a clean balance snapshot can mislead

Blockaid’s argument turns on the difference between a balance and a flow. The attacker’s position existed during the transactions, but the company says the address held effectively nothing in the Aave markets both before and after the attack. A check taken at either point could therefore show no suspicious position, even though more than $1 billion had passed through the markets.

That leaves compliance teams with a different question from whether a suspicious address currently holds funds: did value move through a market they monitor, and who was behind that movement? Blockaid says holder-based reviews can show a market full of legitimate suppliers after an incident, obscuring earlier contact with stolen funds.

The company extends the concern to sanctions screening as a hypothetical, not a claim that a sanctioned entity took part in the Balancer exploit. It says the onchain activity would look the same if a designated entity used the same flash-loan structure. Blockaid adds that the technique requires a flash loan and a smart contract, and says the gas fees in this case were roughly $4.

## Blockaid’s case for tracking flows

Blockaid says regulators expect institutions to use reasonable tools to meet their compliance obligations. The post also says OFAC liability is strict and argues that a program relying only on balance checks could not have detected the activity. Those are Blockaid’s compliance arguments, made in a company blog post that also promotes its own monitoring product.

The product, Risk Exposure, is described as measuring the direction and volume of transfers, attributing activity to entities, and combining flow data with current positions. Blockaid says institutions can set exposure thresholds that trigger incidents and produce records for investigations and regulatory discussions.

The distinction the Balancer-Aave episode illustrates is concrete: a market can show clean balances after an attack even when large sums moved through it during the event. Blockaid’s proposed remedy is to retain the transaction history alongside the position data, so a closed position does not erase the flow.

## Sources

1. Original source · Blog post [Blockaid](https://blockaid.io/blog/a-billion-dollar-blind-spot-what-compliance-teams-miss-in-defi-transaction-monitoring) blockaid.io

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