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MoveVM Flaw Let an Attacker Bridge About $2.7M to Ethereum, Initia Says

A MoveVM script-caching flaw let an attacker create unbacked token balances and bridge about $2.7 million from the network, Initia says. SigIntZero’s analysis traces the funds to Ethereum and says the chain and its rollups were halted 42 minutes after the attack began.

MoveVM Flaw Let an Attacker Bridge About $2.7M to Ethereum, Initia Says

Initia says an attacker exploited its MoveVM script cache on October 23, creating token balances without backing and bridging roughly $2.7 million in real assets to Ethereum before the network halted. The attack began at 14:59 UTC; Initia stopped its Layer 1 and rollups at 15:41:30 UTC, according to the incident timeline reconstructed by SigIntZero.

The security research firm’s October 27 analysis traces the funds through LayerZero and Noble’s connection to Circle’s Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol (CCTP). The attacker exchanged the proceeds for 1,135.52 ETH, which Initia identified as held in a single Ethereum wallet, according to the analysis. Native INIT was not minted and its total supply was unaffected, Initia said.

Initia’s account points to script caching

In its October 24 statement, Initia described malicious code bypassing MoveVM security checks and changing account balances without changing the affected tokens’ recorded total supply. The statement names unbacked WETH, iUSD and USDC balances on Initia, while listing WETH, AUSD0 and USDC among the assets bridged out.

At 14:59 UTC on October 23rd, an attacker exploited a bug in Initia MoveVM’s script caching that allowed malicious code to bypass security checks.

Initia

Initia has not detailed which checks failed or how the cache flaw was triggered. A cache can create risk if it reuses a compiled script or check result without accounting for every input that result depends on, SigIntZero says, but the firm presents that as an explanation of the reported bug, not a confirmed root-cause finding. A technical post-mortem would be needed to establish the mechanism.

Bridge releases turned false balances into real assets

The attacker first credited unbacked balances on Initia, then used cross-chain routes to obtain assets held on Ethereum, according to SigIntZero’s reconstruction. Initia’s statement puts the outflow at 105 WETH and about 1.4 million AUSD0 through LayerZero, plus roughly 1.08 million USDC through Noble and CCTP. The assets were converted into 1,135.52 ETH, according to the statement.

The analysis describes the Ethereum-side releases as valid, correctly attested bridge messages. That distinction matters: the bridges processed messages they accepted as legitimate, while the underlying Initia balances had not been backed by corresponding supply. In other words, Ethereum’s bridge contracts could verify the message without determining whether the tokens burned on Initia originated from a valid mint.

The AUSD naming requires care. Initia identifies AUSD0 in its bridge-out tally, while Agora, the stablecoin’s issuer, said AUSD itself does not exist on Initia and remains fully backed. SigIntZero says the affected asset was a third-party LayerZero mirror, and that real AUSD left the associated Ethereum lockbox.

The halt came after the reported bridge-outs

The attacker moved the assets before the chain and rollups were halted, Initia says. Its October 24 update said a security fix was being prepared for audit, recovery work was under way with security partners, and the team intended to publish a post-mortem after operations safely resumed. SigIntZero reported on October 27 that Initia had not given a restart date or published that post-mortem.

The gap between a compromised balance on one chain and a valid payout on another is the incident’s central security problem. The bridge may be operating as designed and still pay out assets against a balance that should never have existed. Until Initia publishes its technical findings and restart plan, the precise cache failure and the steps taken to prevent a repeat remain unconfirmed.

Sources

  1. Original source · Blog post SigIntZero sigintzero.com

Other pages read

  1. Initia on X x.com
  2. Agora on X x.com

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