# XCM Incident Led to an Estimated Loss of Approximately $1.381 Million in DOT Value, Review Reports

Published 2026-11-04 · Crypto.world Team · Crypto.world

> An XCM executor bug reduced dotUSD’s recorded issuance and distorted pricing, with an estimated loss of approximately $1.381 million in DOT value, Polkadot’s incident review says. A fix made available in June missed the stable-2606 release cut-off, was not included in affected production runtimes and was subsequently incorporated into stable-2609, according to the review.

## dotUSD’s recorded issuance fell without account balances changing

The exploit ran between 24 and 26 October 2026, according to the review, which estimates the loss at approximately $1.381 million in DOT value. The [Polkadot](https://forum.polkadot.network/t/xcm-incident-review-what-happened-and-what-we-learned/19207) Treasury was the only liquidity provider in the affected pool, and no users lost funds.

The XCM executor bug reduced dotUSD’s recorded issuance without changing the balances held by accounts. The protocol expects recorded issuance to equal the sum of account balances, and the exploit broke that assumption. The resulting discrepancy affected pricing in the Hub’s DOT/dotUSD decentralised exchange pool, enabling trades at an artificial exchange rate.

The available on-chain evidence has not established that the attacker who exploited the XCM vulnerability also profited from the subsequent arbitrage, the review says. The bug did not remove dotUSD from account balances, but the understated recorded issuance restricted redemption capacity pending a correction. dotUSD remained fully backed throughout the incident, the review says, while the Peg Stability Module continued to support minting and redemption at a fixed 1:1 ratio with USDT.

## A fix available since June missed the stable-2606 release

XCM programs are meant to be transactional: when a program fails, none of its state changes are applied. Under the bug’s specific circumstances, a program using the WithdrawAsset instruction could revert account debits after an error while persisting the corresponding change to recorded total supply. Repeating that sequence reduced reported dotUSD supply while account balances stayed unchanged.

The messages arrived from Ethereum through Snowbridge, but the underlying bug was in the XCM executor, not Snowbridge. The behaviour was also reproduced without using the bridge, according to the review.

Parity received a report through its Bug Bounty programme in June 2026 and fixed the issue in PR#11910. The bug was initially classified as medium severity based on the potential impact understood at the time, an assessment that did not account for dotUSD, which had not yet launched, or possible implications for OpenGov. The fix missed the stable-2606 release cut-off, was not included in affected production runtimes and was subsequently incorporated into stable-2609; following the incident, the vulnerability was reclassified as critical.

On 20 October, Parity became aware of a public forum comment referencing PR#11910, posted by the same researcher who had reported the issue through the Bug Bounty programme. The disclosure breached the programme’s terms and the researcher deleted the comment a few hours after Parity raised the infraction, the review says. Parity believes the comment may have provided attackers with sufficient context to identify and exploit the vulnerability through other vectors in the days that followed.

## Runtime 2.5.1 was proposed and 2.5.2 was enacted

Ecosystem partners alerted Parity to suspicious activity on 24 October, and Parity investigated and independently reproduced the issue within hours. Snowfork halted its own consensus relayers, which delayed further messages from the attacker and temporarily stopped the attack. Runtime 2.5.1, containing the XCM fix, was proposed through OpenGov that day.

On 26 October, the attacker was able to run its own consensus relayer and continue the attack approximately six hours before the runtime upgrade was applied on-chain. After the upgrade, Parity executed a transaction to rescue the remaining liquidity, leaving the DOT/dotUSD pool with minimal liquidity. Runtime 2.5.2 was approved and enacted through OpenGov on 30 October.

The later upgrade corrected dotUSD’s recorded supply using existing account balances without changing individual balances. It also fixed a Snowbridge weight issue that Parity knew about while preparing 2.5.1 but had attributed to the XCM fix; the review says Parity accepted the risk of stalling Snowbridge given the fix’s importance. The recovered dotUSD was returned to the Treasury.

## Parity plans changes to testing, releases and monitoring

The incident exposed weaknesses in Parity’s security and release processes, the review says: the vulnerability had been identified and a fix merged in June, but the fix had not reached affected production runtimes. Parity plans to improve how it assesses security findings as systems evolve, including more comprehensive tests of XCM failure scenarios and their effects.

For detection, Parity uses an automated agentic framework to analyze pull requests and existing codebases and is refining that tooling to uncover potential exploits earlier. For release speed, it plans to simplify release and backport processes, strengthen checks across release versions and verify that fixes reach deployed runtimes.

Parity is expanding monitoring for unusual changes in asset issuance and clarifying incident-response procedures. It has begun reassessing existing security reports to determine whether their potential impact on dotUSD warrants a change in severity classification. Parity’s priority is to accelerate practical improvements that strengthen prevention, detection and response times, the review says.

## Sources

1. Original source [Polkadot Forum](https://forum.polkadot.network/t/xcm-incident-review-what-happened-and-what-we-learned/19207) forum.polkadot.network

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