# Researchers Find 4.67M Malicious EIP-7702 Delegations

Published 2026-11-02 · Crypto.world Team · Crypto.world

> A study of Ethereum transactions from May 2025 through February 2026 identifies 4.67 million malicious EIP-7702 delegations and 20,443 Ether-redirection attacks. The researchers say more than 607,000 unique accounts delegated to identified sweeper contracts, leaving a large pool exposed to future transfers.

## 4.67 million delegations targeted Ethereum accounts

Researchers counted 4,668,209 malicious EIP-7702 delegations on Ethereum in data spanning May 2025 through February 2026—69.88% of the 6,680,498 valid delegations in their dataset. The study, submitted to [arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41153) on October 30, identifies 20,443 Ether-redirection transactions and 508 malicious “sweeper” contracts.

The headline figure counts delegations, not unique wallets. The researchers separately found that 607,694 unique accounts had delegated to the identified sweeper contracts; 5,745 accounts had already lost Ether in attacks. The paper measures a total profit of 122.98 ETH from the detected transactions, and says that figure is a lower bound on the attack’s overall impact.

> “By evaluating transactions from the first ten months following the introduction of EIP-7702 on Ethereum mainnet, we have identified 4,668,209 malicious delegations, 20,443 attack transactions and 508 ETH sweeper contracts, forming the first EERA dataset.”
>
> [Ziwei Li et al., “Who Swept My ETH? Uncovering EIP-7702-Based Ether Redirection Attacks on Ethereum”](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41153)

## Incoming transfers can trigger the sweep

EIP-7702 lets an externally owned account authorize code held in a smart contract to run through its existing address. That capability supports programmable wallet features, but the study describes how attackers exploit it: after a victim’s account is delegated to a sweeper, an ordinary Ether transfer from someone else can trigger code that redirects the funds to an attacker-controlled address.

Some contracts take only the Ether arriving in that transfer. Others send the account’s full balance, sweeping previously held Ether as well. The attack can therefore affect both the account owner and a sender who believes they are paying the intended recipient. Unlike a typical drain that depends on the victim initiating another transaction, the redirection can happen when a third party sends funds.

The researchers found that 3.28 million malicious delegations occurred in October 2025, about 70% of all malicious delegations they counted. They also linked 4,081 of 4,189 previously reported leaked-key addresses to malicious delegations during the study period. Those findings point to both large-scale batching and compromised credentials as factors behind the totals; the paper does not establish that every affected account was compromised in the same way.

## More than 600,000 accounts remain in the dataset

Of the 607,694 unique accounts that had delegated to identified sweeper contracts, the researchers say 603,487 did not update their delegation after its final malicious assignment, which the paper says leaves them delegated as of late October 2025. A delegation to the zero address can return an account to ordinary externally owned account behavior, but the paper reports only 8,757 such updates in its delegation-update analysis. Those figures describe on-chain delegation changes, not a count of users who saw or understood a warning.

Attackers collected 122.98 ETH across the 20,443 detected transactions, while the paper estimates 48.14 ETH in delegation fees and 0.47 ETH in contract deployment fees. That comparison suggests the operation’s costs came largely before any Ether arrived: malicious delegations could remain in place, waiting for a later transfer to activate the sweep.

## SweeperHunter counts Ether redirection, not every threat

The researchers built SweeperHunter to reconstruct account delegation histories and inspect transaction execution traces. They manually reviewed all 508 identified contracts and sampled one attack transaction per contract; three experts confirmed the malicious sweeping behavior in those checks. The paper reports no false positives in the detected set, but its method looks for a specific pattern: an account in a delegated state receives a plain Ether transfer and redirects Ether to another address.

That scope excludes token sweeps that rely on external contract calls, as well as other EIP-7702 abuse that does not fit the detection rules. The measurements cover Ethereum mainnet, and the authors say comparable activity on other networks is outside their loss totals. They recommend that wallet providers show active delegations, flag risky targets and offer a one-click reset to an ordinary account; users whose keys may be compromised should move remaining assets and warn frequent senders not to send more funds to the affected address.

## Sources

1. Original source · Preprint [Who Swept My ETH? Uncovering EIP-7702-Based Ether Redirection Attacks on Ethereum](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41153) arXiv:2610.41153

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