The Ledger
Scroll replaces mainnet proof verifier after vulnerability report
Scroll registered a replacement verifier for batch version 10 after receiving a bug bounty report. The project says it found no exploitation of the flaw on mainnet.

Emergency replacement
Scroll registered a replacement mainnet proof verifier on November 10 after a bug bounty report identified a flaw that could have allowed an old proof to be accepted for a new public input. The project said in a November 11 governance forum report that it found no exploitation of the vulnerability on Scroll mainnet.
The bug bounty report arrived on November 3 and concerned the bundle proof verifier deployed on Ethereum mainnet. Scroll credited whitehat ZHOUCHUNGONG with reporting the issue and registered the corrected verifier for batch version 10.
How the flaw worked
The affected contract, ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman, verifies OpenVM bundle proofs for ScrollChain. According to the report, it constructed verifier input by hand and sent it to the OpenVM 2.0 Halo2 verifier using a raw static call; the first four bytes of that call came from the proof supplied by the caller.
The OpenVM verifier exposes a typed function with the selector 0x24270d54 alongside its Halo2 fallback. A proof starting with that selector would reach the typed function rather than the fallback, Scroll said, and the function would then read public values from offsets controlled by the caller.
The report said an old, valid proof could consequently be accepted for a new public input, allowing an arbitrary state root and withdrawal root to be finalized. Exploitation required either the permissioned prover role or enforced batch mode, which opens after seven days without finalization, according to Scroll.
Scroll said earlier verifier versions were unaffected because their Halo2 verifiers had no function selector, so every call reached the fallback. The project also said enforced batch mode never opened while the vulnerable verifier was active.
Changes to the verifier
The replacement was registered in MultipleVersionRollupVerifier. Its address is 0xb15417122fB6E853d84e498517268d33d7301e74, and the associated code change is scroll-tech/scroll-contracts#181, with merge commit 8264260.
Scroll said the new verifier calls the OpenVM wrapper through its typed entry point. The selector, commitments and public-input hash now come from the contract rather than from the proof, according to the report; the constructor also rejects an empty verifier address and out-of-range digests.
Checks after the upgrade
The report said 233 past finalization transactions replayed through ScrollChain on mainnet forks finalized with the same roots, while tampered copies were rejected. A differential fuzz test and a mainnet-fork byte comparison showed the new verifier passing identical input to the Halo2 verifier, according to Scroll.
Scroll also reported that every Safe and timelock transaction in the upgrade path was simulated before signing. The deployed verifier's bytecode matched the code change and retained the previous verifier's settings, the project said.
For its exploitation check, Scroll said all 748 finalizations while the vulnerable verifier was active used regular proofs without the malicious selector prefix, as confirmed through an RPC node and Etherscan. The forum post also includes a prompt for checking the upgrade with read-only RPC calls and public sources; its checks include the verifier registration and traces of finalization transactions after registration.
Sources
- Original source Scroll Governance Forum forum.scroll.io
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