The Ledger
Shaw Rebuilds daos.fun’s Solana Program Byte for Byte, Reports a Critical Flaw
Shaw, founder of ai16z and Eliza Labs, says he rebuilt daos.fun’s closed-source Solana program into open-source code that compiles to the identical binary and found a critical flaw. The audit in his repository says an unprivileged caller can divert another DAO’s migration fee; no fix has been deployed.

Shaw, the founder of ai16z and Eliza Labs, said on October 24 that he had pulled daos.fun’s Solana program from the chain and rebuilt it as open-source code that compiles to the same binary, and that the work turned up a critical vulnerability in the program running on mainnet. He posted the claim on X at 10:14 UTC with a link to the reconstruction on GitHub.
“Found a critical security vulnerability in the mainnet program too, oops!”
Shaw, founder of ai16z and Eliza Labs, on X
Shaw framed the project as a test of whether a Solana program with no published source could be reverse-engineered into a byte-identical open-source version. His post ends with the line “There is no security by obscurity anymore”. In a reply on X he wrote: “Less than an hour and fully automated”.
A byte-identical rebuild
The repository, lalalune/daosfun-source, sits on the GitHub account Shaw lists on his own site. It names the program 4FqThZWv3QKWkSyXCDmATpWkpEiCHq5yhkdGWpSEDAZM and says its Anchor/Rust reconstruction “produces the complete captured binary byte for byte”. The captured original and the rebuilt binary are both 1,120,784 bytes and carry the same SHA-256 hash. The repository adds that the original comments and identifiers cannot be uniquely recovered from a binary.
One critical finding, confirmed on the original
The repository’s audit reports six findings reproduced against the original binary: one critical, four medium and one low. The critical one, BM-1, is titled “Missing DAO-to-DBC-pool binding permits migration-fee diversion and state corruption” and sits in the finalize_meteora_bonding instruction. According to the audit, that instruction accepts any DBC pool a caller supplies, with nothing tying the pool to the DAO it finalizes, and it places no admin check on the signer.
The audit sets out the attack in steps. An attacker creates a DAO of their own, waits for a legitimate DAO to reach its migration threshold, then calls the instruction with their own DAO’s state and treasury but the victim’s pool. The migration fee, which can be withdrawn only once, is paid into the attacker’s treasury, and the victim’s own finalization then fails for good. In a variant, a caller sets the state of a DAO that has not yet finalized to show its curve as initialized, permanently blocking its curve, raise and migration steps. The audit’s impact section begins: “Permanent, unrecoverable redirection of a DAO's migration fee (treasury funds) into an attacker-controlled treasury, by an unprivileged actor with no relationship to the victim DAO”.
The four medium findings, the audit says, require privileged actions, off-chain approval or particular configurations. The low one is a snapshot-timing griefing defect that, in the audit’s words, “does not demonstrate theft of funds already included in a snapshot.”
Tested in a simulator; no fix deployed
The repository’s proof of concept runs against the captured binary in LiteSVM, a local Solana test environment. There, the audit records 1,000 funding-token units of one DAO’s migration fee moving into another DAO’s treasury. The audit also states: “This source deliberately retains the vulnerabilities; no fix has been deployed.” It says it concerns the captured executable, “not a live view of mainnet”, and that its test artifacts “do not imply any mainnet execution or observed loss.”
Short of an upgrade, the audit suggests the platform could finalize each DAO itself as soon as it becomes eligible, leaving an attacker no window to front-run it. It calls this “a race mitigation, not a fix”.
daos.fun had already stopped new launches
daos.fun’s website says the platform is no longer maintained and no longer supports creating new DAOs or tokens. CoinNess, which reported Shaw’s claim on October 24, said existing tokens remain tradable.
Sources
- Original source · Social media post Shaw · page 1 x.com
Other pages read
- daosfun-source (GitHub) github.com
- daosfun-source audit (GitHub) github.com
- Shaw · page 2 x.com
- Shaw · page 3 shawmakesmagic.com
- CoinNess coinness.com
- daos.fun
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