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SILMARILS-MV Cuts Post-Quantum Certificate Traffic—With a Trade-Off

SILMARILS-MV is a multi-verifier signature scheme designed to reduce authentication traffic in permissioned blockchains. Its reported gains come with a different verification model: verifiers need secret credentials issued through the validator committee.

SILMARILS-MV Cuts Post-Quantum Certificate Traffic—With a Trade-Off

SILMARILS-MV aims to shrink authentication traffic in post-quantum permissioned blockchains, but its certificates are not designed for verification by just anyone. Introduced in a paper submitted October 22, 2026, the scheme uses secret verifier credentials and committee-controlled admission. Its authors report lower authentication traffic in a 1,000-validator model and higher throughput in a 100-validator prototype than in their ML-DSA-44 comparison.

Source arxiv.org

Smaller certificates, restricted verification

The authors describe SILMARILS-MV as an information-theoretically secure, multi-verifier signature scheme. Its signatures can be combined linearly, allowing validators to produce a compact quorum certificate rather than pass around separate signatures. The design also uses threshold notarization: the validator committee signs as a group, releasing signature shares only for values the committee has decided.

That approach changes who can verify evidence. Standard public-key signatures can be checked by anyone with the public key; SILMARILS-MV gives each verifier a secret key, and verifiers must be admitted. The paper’s authors, Khadijeh Bagheri, Hassan Khodaiemehr and Chen Feng, write:

“This paper asks whether a signature can be information-theoretically secure and at the same time non-interactive, multi-use, transferable without bound, aggregatable, and free of any single trusted authority, using only an assumption a BFT committee already makes: an honest supermajority t<n/3. We answer affirmatively with SILMARILS-MV.”

Khadijeh Bagheri, Hassan Khodaiemehr and Chen Feng, paper authors

What the 1,000-validator estimate measures

In the paper’s analytic normal-case model, threshold notarization at 1,000 validators requires an estimated 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block. The authors describe that as 22 times less traffic than ML-DSA-44 within the admitted-verifier setting they consider. The estimate covers authentication traffic, not all traffic in a complete, deployed ledger.

The paper also reports a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators. In the authors’ comparison, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8 times more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44, with 67 times less cryptographic CPU use. The paper says Monte Carlo attacks were consistent with the security bounds. These results are a model estimate and a prototype evaluation, rather than a report on a production deployment.

Key issuance and committee operation

Validators issue keys through perfectly secure multiparty computation, under the assumption that fewer than a third of committee members are faulty. The abstract says issuance does not require broadcast. The scheme’s threshold-notarization mode makes finality certificates constant in size—32 times the number of tolerated verifier corruptions plus one, in bytes—and makes per-validator issuance cost independent of committee size.

The paper also describes arbiter-verified keys that let clients produce 32-byte signatures, which can be checked in batches. Verifiers can be enrolled after the fact, while redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh. The authors report that a certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds.

A different fit from public-key standards

SILMARILS-MV offers compact, aggregatable authentication and a security argument that does not rely on computational hardness for messages in the scheme’s stated model. In exchange, it requires credentialed verifiers and committee-run key issuance; key material is consumed as signatures are made and refreshed between epochs.

The paper’s comparison therefore turns on who needs to verify a certificate. A system that requires any outside party to check evidence against a public key uses a different verification model from SILMARILS-MV. For permissioned committees willing to control access to verification, the authors present the scheme as an alternative whose reported traffic and prototype results merit further evaluation.

Sources

  1. Original source · Preprint arXiv arXiv:2610.31814

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