# Zealynx maps Aave V3.8’s reentrancy guard for integrators

Published 2026-11-20 · Crypto.world Team · Crypto.world

> A technical post by Zealynx details which Aave V3.8 Pool calls are guarded and which remain open during flash-loan callbacks. The post also reports different Pool revision numbers across networks and describes a way to probe whether the lock is active.

## What the guard covers

A technical post by Zealynx on Aave’s [governance](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-v3-8-for-integrators-what-the-reentrancy-guard-covers-and-what-it-leaves-open/26456) forum maps which Aave V3.8 Pool operations take a reentrancy lock, which only check it, and what integrators can read during a flash-loan callback. Zealynx says V3.8 went live on Ethereum Core on November 11, citing payload 481 and block 26392162, and that `POOL_REVISION()` returns 12 on all 16 instances listed in the upgrade proposal.

The guarded state-changing calls listed in the post include supply, withdraw, borrow, repayment variants, liquidation, collateral and eMode settings, `mintToTreasury`, and the older `deposit` function. Zealynx also says `finalizeTransfer` is guarded, so an aToken transfer cannot settle during another Pool action; liquidations paying out in aTokens still work through `transferOnLiquidation`.

## Flash loans and callbacks

Zealynx says `flashLoan`, `flashLoanSimple` and `rescueTokens` check whether the lock is set but do not set it themselves. That means a flash loan cannot be started from inside another Pool action, while calls made during `executeOperation` remain possible, as in V3.7. In a mainnet-fork test, Zealynx says supplying USDC from a `flashLoanSimple` callback succeeded.

To test a callback-triggering token, the post says Zealynx replaced USDC’s code on a fork with code that calls back during `transferFrom`, then supplied it. In that test, `flashLoanSimple`, `mintToTreasury` and a zero-value aUSDC transfer reverted with `ReentrancyGuardReentrantCall`, while `getUserAccountData` returned normally. Zealynx reports gas use was about 550 higher per guarded call in the snapshots cited.

## Reads during a flash loan

The post says the flash-loan callback remains unlocked and describes how Pool readings can change within it. In a test borrowing all but 1 USDC from the Core USDC reserve, Zealynx says `getVirtualUnderlyingBalance` returned 1 USDC during the callback, while `maxWithdraw` for a stataUSDC holder with about 1.19M USDC of shares returned 0.999999 USDC; the values returned after repayment.

Zealynx attributes those readings to the Pool reducing `virtualUnderlyingBalance` before calling the receiver and updating rates after repayment. The post says a vault or router that sizes transfers from such reads could be shown an empty reserve during a transaction, for the flash premium, which it gives as 5 bps on Core “today.” It adds that the same behavior occurred in V3.7.

## Checking deployment status

The post says the Pool has no public lock getter and that another contract cannot read its transient storage. Zealynx describes a `staticcall` to `mintToTreasury` with an empty array as a probe: if the lock is set, it reverts with selector `0x3ee5aeb5`; otherwise it reverts with empty data. The post says its fork test returned the selector inside a supply hook and empty data outside, and that the call was capped at 20k gas.

As of November 20, Zealynx listed revision 12 on Ethereum Core and Lido, Arbitrum, Base, [Optimism](https://crypto.world/companies/op-labs), [Polygon](https://crypto.world/companies/polygon-labs), Avalanche, BNB, Gnosis, Linea, Mantle, Celo, Plasma, Monad, X Layer and MegaETH. The post listed Scroll, Sonic and the EtherFi instance at revision 11; zkSync, Metis and Soneium at 10; and Horizon at 7. AaveLabs’ earlier proposal says the rollout covers active instances, while Zealynx advises checking `POOL_REVISION()` on each chain rather than assuming the guard is present everywhere.

## Sources

1. Original source [Aave governance forum · Aave v3 for integrators what the reentrancy guard covers an…](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-v3-8-for-integrators-what-the-reentrancy-guard-covers-and-what-it-leaves-open/26456) governance.aave.com

Other pages read

2. [Aave governance forum · Arfc Aave v3](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-aave-v3-8/25891) governance.aave.com

## Companies in this story

- [Aave Labs](https://crypto.world/companies/aave-labs)

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