# Canonical LST: A Protocol-Native Liquid Staking Solution for Tezos

Crypto.world

> Liquid staking on proof-of-stake networks is typically run by third-party intermediaries. Because liquidity creates a "winner-take-all" dynamic, a private operator that captures the most liquid…

**arXiv**: 2605.00828

**Published**: 2026-03-15

**Authors**: Mathias Bourgoin, Arthur Breitman, Pierrick Couderc, Zaynah Dargaye, Diane Gallois-Wong, Marina Polubelova, Lucas Randazzo, Julien Tesson

## AI summary

Canonical LST: A Protocol-Native Liquid Staking Solution for Tezos

## Overview

**Research area:** Distributed systems and blockchain protocol design — specifically proof-of-stake (PoS) staking economics, liquid staking token architecture, and on-chain governance.

**Technical level:** Intermediate. The paper is a protocol design white paper: it defines state variables, transition rules and invariants, and assumes familiarity with staking, slashing and token standards, but it is written in accessible prose with plain-language "User View" boxes rather than proofs or experiments.

**Scope:** A design specification for Canonical LST (sTEZ), an enshrined liquid staking mechanism built directly into the Tezos protocol, covering its lifecycle mechanics, exchange-rate model, valuation and reporting methodology, compliance touchpoints, risk posture and governance.

## What This Paper Is About

Liquid staking on proof-of-stake networks is typically run by third-party intermediaries. Because liquidity creates a "winner-take-all" dynamic, a private operator that captures the most liquid staking token can gain disproportionate control over consensus and introduce discretionary, opaque, or capturable governance. Canonical LST addresses this by making liquid staking a native feature of the Tezos protocol itself: any tez holder can deposit into a shared, protocol-managed stake and receive sTEZ, a fungible token whose exchange rate to tez absorbs all rewards and slashing, with no administrator keys and no third-party operator in the core loop. It is explicitly intended to complement direct staking rather than replace it.

## Key Contributions

1. **An enshrined liquid staking design.** The paper specifies sTEZ as a protocol-issued FA2.1 fungible token whose entire lifecycle — deposit, mint, validator assignment, redemption, freezing, finalization and slashing — is implemented inside the Tezos protocol, removing administrator keys and the need for off-chain coordination, operators, or a fund-like structure.
2. **A minimal accrual-based exchange-rate model.** Value is expressed as a single on-chain ratio R_t = L_t / S_t (tez per token), where L_t is total tez in the staking ledger and S_t is circulating sTEZ supply. Rewards increase L_t, slashing decreases L_t, and S_t changes only via deposit minting and redemption burning. Balances never rebase, and no rewards are paid out as separate transactions.
3. **A complete deterministic state machine with stated invariants.** The paper defines the state variables (staking ledger, token supply, validator registry, frozen ledger, finalizable ledger), the block- and cycle-level transition rules, and five invariants including zero-supply handling (R_t := 1 when S_t = 0) and supply conservation.
4. **A structured treatment of valuation, compliance, risk and governance.** The paper maps the mechanics to NAV reporting (including the optional FX multiplier), custody and audit workflows, six named risk scenarios with mitigations, and the five-phase Tezos amendment process with immutable core parameters.

## Main Findings

- **Mechanics preserve the exchange rate on deposit.** At block t a deposit of Δ tez mints u = Δ/R_t sTEZ and updates L_t := L_t + Δ, S_t := S_t + u. The paper notes there is no fixed one-to-one peg after genesis: once R_t > 1, each mutez (1 tez = 1,000,000 mutez) mints fewer than one token.
- **Rewards and slashing are expressed only through the rate.** Rewards credit L_{t+1} := L_t + Δ_t with S_t unchanged; slashing sets L_t := L_t − p(v) with S_t unchanged. Both therefore show up as discrete moves in R_t, so losses are borne pro-rata by all holders via a lower rate per token rather than by adjusting balances.
- **Redemption is a burn-then-freeze sequence.** A redemption burns u tokens immediately, moves v = u · R_t from the staking ledger into a per-cycle frozen bucket F_t[c(t)], and stops rewarding the user immediately while keeping the funds exposed to slashing. Frozen funds are slashed by the same percentage p as the staking ledger, remain backing consensus rights already issued for the relevant horizon, cannot be traded or reassigned, and are moved to the finalizable ledger E_t at the maturity cycle boundary for permissionless withdrawal.
- **Validator allocation is capped, deterministic and delay-offset.** The distribution function A_k respects per-validator capacity cap(v), sums exactly to L_{t_k}, and only includes eligible validators (clean recent slashing history, declared fee and capacity). Rights computed at a cycle boundary take effect after the protocol constant `consensus_rights_delay`, currently two full cycles.
- **Slashing is rare and small in practice on Tezos.** Under Adaptive Slashing, double-attestation penalties scale with the fraction of attesters that double-sign, while double baking follows a fixed penalty schedule. Denunciations can be included during the faulty block's cycle and the following one, with penalties executing at the end of that window. The paper states that since the Paris activation and the adoption of Adaptive Slashing, only a single slashing event has been recorded.
- **Centralized intermediaries differ on nine dimensions.** Table 1 contrasts control, fee structure, validator set, reward handling, slashing risk, data access, upgrades and governance alignment, concluding that intermediaries — even DAO-governed ones — add a trust layer whose incentives can diverge from chain health and whose governance is prone to capture by incumbents blocking new validators.
- **Valuation needs only two on-chain scalars.** IndicativeNAV_t = H_t × R_t × FX_t, where H_t is the holder's token balance and FX_t an optional external exchange rate; the paper suggests a tolerance band of, for example, 5 basis points when reconciling a window and attributing ΔR to rewards, slashing and straddling flows.
- **Governance has no emergency bypass.** Amendments run through five fixed periods of 14 cycles each (roughly 2.5 months in total) — proposal, exploration vote, cooldown, promotion vote, adoption — with an 80% super-majority threshold and a quorum updated via an exponential moving average of past participation. Immutable core parameters include per-validator stake caps, global aggregate stake limits, eligibility criteria, the fee-market configuration and redemption policy.
- **Empirical results are not reported.** The paper presents no benchmarks, datasets, simulations, audit results, or measured fee, cap or unbonding-period values; the market-dynamics section is explicitly labelled "Outstanding."

## Methodology in Plain English

This is a design-and-specification paper, not an experimental study. The authors' approach is to move an existing financial function — pooled liquid staking — out of private smart contracts and into the blockchain's own protocol code, then reason carefully about what that implies.

They start from the state the system must track: how much tez is staked, how many tokens exist, which validators are eligible and at what fee and capacity, which funds are frozen for unbonding, and which are ready to withdraw. They then define, for each user action and each protocol event, exactly how those quantities change — a deposit, a redemption request, a cycle-boundary reward payment, a slashing penalty. Because every rule is mechanical, anyone can recompute the exchange rate from two public numbers.

Around that core they build the surrounding argument: a side-by-side comparison with operator-run services, a valuation formula usable by funds and auditors, a mapping to compliance and custody workflows with compliance obligations pushed to "wrappers," a risk register of six scenarios with mitigations, and a description of how changes would have to pass through Tezos' existing on-chain amendment votes. Tezos' own properties — 20 protocol upgrades since mainnet launch in 2018 without contentious chain splits, an OCaml reference implementation, 6-second block targets with near-instant two-block finality, and no protocol-level downtime or successful chain attacks since launch — are cited as the foundation the design relies on.

## Why This Matters

**Impact on research.** The paper reframes liquid staking as a protocol-level public good rather than a commercial product, and offers a concrete, fully specified alternative to the dominant intermediary model. It gives researchers a testable reference design — accrual accounting with a single exchange rate, deterministic capped allocation, no admin keys — for studying centralization in staking markets and for comparing enshrined versus contract-based architectures.

**Real-world applications:**

- **DeFi collateral and liquidity:** sTEZ is a standard FA2.1 asset that can be traded on a DEX or transferred directly without triggering protocol redemption or freeze periods, so it can serve as a yield-bearing, tez-denominated building block.
- **Regulated wrappers and funds:** custodians, brokers and issuers can layer KYC/AML, sanctions and beneficial-ownership controls on top, while relying on the protocol for deterministic issuance, redemption and lifecycle events.
- **NAV reporting and auditing:** funds can publish daily NAVs or intraday indicative values from two on-chain scalars plus an FX feed, with per-request redemption ticket identifiers and structured on-chain events as the audit trail.
- **Validator markets:** any eligible validator can permissionlessly register a fee and capacity and receive allocations under caps, creating an open, ranked fee market rather than a curated operator set.

**Industry relevance.** For any proof-of-stake network with on-chain governance, the paper is a template for blunting the "winner-take-all" liquidity dynamic in liquid staking before a private intermediary entrenches. It also speaks directly to institutional adoption concerns — no privileged keys, no rebasing accounting, reconstructible state from an archive node, and a predictable multi-week upgrade notice process.

## Future Directions

- **Market dynamics are left open.** Section 5.7 is explicitly marked "Outstanding": how large one-sided redemption flows, thin market depth, yield sensitivity and liquidity provisioning affect sTEZ's secondary price relative to R_t is described qualitatively, not modelled or measured.
- **Parameter calibration is unspecified.** The paper names per-validator caps, global aggregate stake limits, eligibility criteria, fee-market configuration, redemption policy and the unbonding period as governance-set constants, but reports no chosen values or analysis of how they should be set.
- **Liquidity fragmentation across competing LSTs.** The authors note that multiple liquid staking options can fragment liquidity, and argue that being protocol-enshrined reduces smart-contract risk and could over time concentrate liquidity in sTEZ — a claim that would need empirical validation after launch.
- **Audit and testnet evidence.** The stated mitigations for implementation flaws rest on multiple independent security audits and multi-testnet exercise before activation; the paper reports neither completed audits nor testnet results, and the shortened "bug-fix amendment" path mentioned in R1 is not detailed.

## Target Audience

Protocol designers and core developers working on proof-of-stake consensus and staking economics; Tezos validators ("bakers") and ecosystem tooling developers; and the institutional readers the paper explicitly addresses — custodians, fund and product issuers, NAV agents and compliance teams evaluating whether an enshrined liquid staking token meets their reporting, audit and governance expectations. It is also useful to researchers studying centralization and governance capture in staking markets, who will find the comparison framework and invariants more valuable than empirical results, since none are reported.

## Authors’ abstract

Canonical LST (sTEZ) is an enshrined, protocol-native mechanism designed to mitigate the centralization risks associated with liquid staking intermediaries. Intended to complement direct staking rather than replace it, Canonical LST provides a neutral, public alternative managed directly by the Tezos protocol. It allows any tez holder to participate in aggregated staking without reliance on third-party operators. sTEZ follows an accrual-based design: all slashing events and…

[The full abstract on arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00828)

[Read the original paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00828)

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Canonical: https://crypto.world/paper/canonical-lst-a-protocol-native-liquid-staking-solution-for-tezos-2605.00828
