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Competing Auctions in Intermediated Markets

In most auction theory, "competing auctions" means several sellers competing for buyers. Here the situation is reversed: there is one seller with one good (the right to build the next Ethereum…

Competing Auctions in Intermediated Markets
arXiv
2606.06633
Published
2026-06-04
Authors
Bruno Mazorra, Minghao Pan, Christoph Schlegel

AI summary

Overview

Research area: Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design, applied to blockchain market structure — specifically Ethereum's proposer-builder separation (PBS) and the MEV supply chain.

Technical level: Advanced. The paper is a formal theory paper built from lemmas, theorems, and propositions with full proofs; the results are stated in the language of Bayes–Nash equilibrium, single-homing versus multi-homing, and information disclosure. The paper reports no empirical measurements, no datasets, and no numerical benchmarks — its claims are analytical.

Scope (one sentence): The paper characterizes what happens to auction formats run by intermediaries (relays) when a single seller can also sell through a competing in-protocol sealed first-price channel, with Ethereum's forthcoming Glamsterdam/ePBS upgrade as the motivating case.

What This Paper Is About

In most auction theory, "competing auctions" means several sellers competing for buyers. Here the situation is reversed: there is one seller with one good (the right to build the next Ethereum block), but several parallel mechanisms run by intermediaries that the seller can choose among. The paper asks which auction formats an intermediary can actually sustain once the protocol itself offers a native sealed-bid first-price channel, and whether the seller can credibly promise not to leak bids it receives.

Key Contributions

  1. Proves full unraveling under single-homing (Theorem 1). When bidders must pick exactly one channel and the intermediary can enforce that, a sealed second-price intermediary auction collapses completely: in the unique symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium, every type bids in the native first-price auction.

  2. Proves essential uniqueness under multi-homing / multiplexing (Theorem 2). Without enforcement, the second-price relay still loses: the item is always allocated through the first-price auction, and the second-price bid is payoff-irrelevant.

  3. Characterizes when open bidding and bid leakage survive. Open-bid formats unravel into first-price behavior (Propositions 1 and 5); leakage is harmless with one fast bidder (Proposition 2) but occurs in equilibrium with two or more (Theorem 3); and a seller who can commit ex ante optimally commits to no disclosure (Proposition 4).

  4. Derives design implications for Ethereum's Glamsterdam/ePBS upgrade. The availability of an in-protocol first-price channel is argued to severely limit the design space for out-of-protocol relay auctions.

Main Findings

  • Second-price formats do not survive a first-price outside option. Bidders still bid truthfully conditional on entering the second-price auction (Lemma 1), but entering at all becomes unattractive; under single-homing the second-price auction unravels and bidders self-select into the first-price auction (Theorem 1).
  • Under multi-homing the good is allocated through the first-price auction with probability 1 (Theorem 2). Every symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium with a strictly increasing first-price bid takes the form of the standard first-price bidding function plus a second-price bid weakly below it, so the second-price coordinate can be set to zero without loss.
  • Open bidding formats collapse into first price. In the no-last-look benchmark, "all-first-price" is an equilibrium while the all-English profile is unstable in large markets (Proposition 1); more generally, bidders have an incentive to bid as late as possible to avoid having their bids shared, turning open auctions into sealed ones (Propositions 1 and 5).
  • A single fast bidder is not enough to make leakage profitable. A first-price auction is leakage-resistant in the presence of one "fast" bidder (Proposition 2), because sharing information with a single fast bidder is not optimal for the seller.
  • With |S| ≥ 2 fast bidders, the seller leaks in equilibrium (Theorem 3), and fast bidders themselves benefit from bid disclosure (Proposition 3).
  • Commitment reverses the leakage result. If the seller can credibly commit ex ante to a disclosure rule, the optimal commitment is to share no information at all, and the seller weakly prefers to commit to a credible sealed-bid first-price channel (Proposition 4).
  • Single-homing enforcement is fragile in practice. The Theorem 1 conclusion depends on the relay's ability to detect multi-plexing; where bidders can use Sybil identities, one bid per channel under distinct identities is feasible, so the effective environment is multi-homing.
  • Trustless in-protocol payment has a capital cost. Under ePBS, builders must pre-fund bids from their beacon-chain balance; for ordinary blocks this constraint may be mild, but for high-value blocks it can bind, leaving room for intermediated bids that supply credit and faster settlement. The paper does not model this friction explicitly.

Methodology in Plain English

The authors build a stylized two-channel model. There are n ≥ 2 bidders with independent private values drawn from a continuous, strictly increasing distribution F on a compact interval. Two auctions run in parallel — a native sealed-bid first-price auction and a relay auction whose format the authors vary (sealed second-price, open/English). Whichever auction yields higher revenue wins the item and charges the winner.

The paper then varies three modeling knobs. First, participation: either bidders must commit to one channel (single-homing, enforceable if the relay can detect deviations) or they may bid in both (multi-homing, which is the default when Sybil identities are available). Second, information: whether bids are sealed, openly observed, or selectively disclosed by the seller to a subset of latency-advantaged ("fast") bidders. Third, commitment: whether the seller can bind itself ex ante to a disclosure rule, or instead decides history-by-history which early bids to leak.

Within each configuration the authors solve for symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibria using standard first-price auction machinery, payoff comparisons, and deviation arguments, then check whether the second-price or open-bid channel attracts any participation. A deliberate modeling choice is private rather than common values: block builders do not search themselves — the paper names Titan, BuilderNet, and Quasar as dominant neutral builders — so a builder's block value is deterministic and known once bundles arrive, even though the underlying order flow value is uncertain upstream at the searcher level.

Why This Matters

Impact on research. The competing-auctions literature (McAfee 1993; Peters and Severinov 1997; Burguet and Sákovics 1999; Ellison et al. 2004) studies competing sellers. Platform-competition work (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Armstrong 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006) studies single-homing versus multi-homing but focuses on platform pricing, not equilibrium auction outcomes. This paper fills the gap of one seller, many intermediary-run mechanisms, and shows that revenue equivalence cannot shortcut the analysis because the allocation rule is itself an equilibrium object. It also contrasts with the Milgrom–Weber linkage principle: under private values, disclosure is not about value discovery but about changing the strategic environment.

Real-world applications (as discussed in the paper):

  • Ethereum block building under ePBS / Glamsterdam. Predicting whether relays remain relevant once EIP-7732 provides a native bid-and-commitment layer with SignedExecutionPayloadBid, protocol-enforced payment, and Payload Timeliness Committee checks.
  • Relay design. Telling relay operators which formats (sealed second-price, open-bidding, optimistic relaying) can survive competition from an in-protocol channel, and noting that some relays such as the Ultrasound relay already experiment with "second-price" features.
  • Proposer-side commitment technology. Reputation (the paper cites large staking pools like Lido) or hardware such as Trusted Execution Environments as ways to credibly promise not to leak received bids, or delegation to a "sealed-bid first-price" relay.
  • Traditional finance order routing. The single-order-routed-across-venues problem under best-execution rules — lit exchanges, dark pools, retail wholesalers, periodic auctions, RFQ systems — and the last-look provision analogy in FX markets (Oomen 2017).

Industry relevance. The headline practical claim is that an in-protocol first-price bidding channel severely constrains what out-of-protocol intermediaries can offer. If that channel is credibly sealed, the market converges to first price everywhere; if it is leaky because proposers cannot commit, at least two latency-advantaged bidders create an incentive to leak. Since commitment to non-disclosure is optimal whenever feasible (Proposition 4), the authors argue the no-disclosure equilibrium can plausibly be recovered institutionally.

Future Directions

  • Endogenizing commitment technology. Reputation, TEEs, and relay delegation are discussed informally; a formal model of how credibility is established and priced is left open.
  • Modeling capital constraints explicitly. The paper flags that builders must pre-fund in-protocol bids under ePBS, that this can bind for high-value blocks, and that it is deliberately not modeled — a natural extension.
  • Correlated private values. The authors assume i.i.d. private values, note that builders often receive the same bundles so values are positively correlated, and conjecture that correlation pushes in the same direction as their results (sketching a public-state formulation) without proving it in general.
  • Sybil-proof single-homing. Uniqueness fails when agents can split bids across identities; how a relay could detect or price multi-plexing, and what equilibrium selection applies, remains open. The paper also sets aside "free-option" concerns about EIP-7732 payload-delivery failure and PTC deadline placement (citing Mazorra et al. 2025), assuming mitigation.

Target Audience

Mechanism-design and game-theory researchers working on competing or intermediated auctions; Ethereum protocol researchers and EIP-7732/ePBS designers; relay operators and block-building infrastructure teams deciding which auction formats to offer; and market-structure researchers in traditional finance interested in order routing, last look, and seller-controlled information disclosure.

Authors’ abstract

We analyze competing auctions in intermediated markets, where a seller selects among parallel mechanisms for the sale of a single good, most prominently the relay-and-protocol architecture of proposer-builder separation in Ethereum. When the intermediary can enforce single-homing on its bidders, sealed-bid second-price intermediary auctions fully unravel into the sealed first-price principal auction; open bidding-format intermediaries unravel only partially, collapsing into…

The full abstract on arXiv
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