# Enshrined Proposer Builder Separation in the presence of Maximal Extractable Value

Crypto.world

> Ethereum's community proposed enshrined Proposer Builder Separation (ePBS, EIP-7732) to remove reliance on trusted off-chain relays and make builder payments enforceable at the consensus level.

**arXiv**: 2601.12989

**Published**: 2026-01-19

**Authors**: Yitian Wang, Yebo Feng, Yingjiu Li, Jiahua Xu

## AI summary

## Overview

**Research area:** Blockchain consensus and mechanism design — specifically Ethereum's Proof-of-Stake (PoS), Proposer Builder Separation (PBS), enshrined PBS as drafted in EIP-7732, and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).

**Technical level:** Advanced. The paper combines formal utility modeling, game-theoretic proofs (lemmas and theorems about bidding strategies and auction equilibria), and calibrated agent-based simulation.

**Scope:** A single-paper evaluation of whether embedding PBS directly into Ethereum's consensus layer (ePBS) improves or worsens fairness, decentralization, and transaction manipulation relative to standard PoS, judged through MEV-driven auction dynamics.

## What This Paper Is About

Ethereum's community proposed enshrined Proposer Builder Separation (ePBS, EIP-7732) to remove reliance on trusted off-chain relays and make builder payments enforceable at the consensus level. The open question is whether this redesign actually reduces centralization and MEV-driven manipulation, or simply moves the problem. The authors build a formal model of users, builders, and proposers plus simulations, and find that ePBS decentralizes proposer revenue while sharply concentrating builder profits and MEV extraction.

## Key Contributions

1. A formal framework of users, builders, and proposers under ePBS, modeling single-block auction dynamics and long-term effects, including network latency as a weighted graph and a maximum of 24 bidding rounds per slot. The theoretical results show MEV-seeking builders consistently dominate auctions and that re-staking drives long-term concentration.
2. Calibrated agent-based simulations using Ethereum on-chain data, showing that proposer revenue becomes more decentralized under ePBS while builders capture an overwhelming share of MEV, amplifying market concentration and transaction reordering compared with PoS.
3. An identification of ePBS's fundamental limitation: it achieves decentralization at the proposer level but intensifies centralization among builders and worsens MEV-driven manipulation.
4. Two framed research questions — RQ1 on fairness/decentralization (block construction decentralization, profit distribution between builders and validators, and effects of profit restaking and accumulation) and RQ2 on transaction manipulation.

## Main Findings

- **Profit inequality rises sharply:** The Gini coefficient for profits rises from 0.1749 under standard PoS without ePBS to 0.8358 under ePBS. The authors interpret this as a small number of efficient builders capturing most value via MEV-driven auctions.
- **Proposer payout bias:** 95.4% of the block value is rewarded to proposers in ePBS, described as a strong economic bias given their limited role in block assembly.
- **Proposer-level decentralization improves:** Proposer revenue becomes more decentralized under ePBS, even as builder concentration worsens.
- **MEV builders have higher block valuations:** Theorem 3 shows that, with identical mempools and identical bidding strategies, an attacking builder's private valuation is weakly greater than a benign builder's at every round, with strict inequality when at least one attacking transaction generates strictly positive net value.
- **PoS versus ePBS differ in what valuation buys:** Under standard PoS, proposers are selected uniformly at random proportional to stake, so higher per-block MEV returns do not increase the probability of producing blocks; under ePBS the auction ties valuation directly to winning.
- **Bidding bounds:** Theorem 1 states that optimal bids satisfy b_i,t in (0, v_i,t], that passive non-participation (b = 0) is weakly dominated by competitive participation, and that overbidding (b > v) is weakly dominated by bidding at valuation.
- **Latency-dependent equilibrium:** Theorem 2 shows that with maximum bid propagation delay Δ, the highest-valuation builder wins, the winning bid lies between the second-highest and highest valuations, and as Δ approaches 0 the winning bid approaches the second-highest valuation plus an arbitrarily small increment. The authors note that in reality latency means the highest-valuation builder does not always win.
- **Attack insertion rule:** A builder inserts an MEV attack transaction only if the MEV profit exceeds the total gas fees of transactions displaced to make room. In the paper's worked example, a benign builder earns 65 gwei from fees (30 + 20 + 15), while an attacking builder earns 85 gwei by inserting a 0-gas attack against a victim with m = 50 gwei and g = 5 gwei; if the MEV were only 10 gwei, the attack block would total 45 gwei and would not be attempted.
- **Prior concentration context:** The paper cites evidence that between late 2023 and early 2024, just three builders produced nearly 80% of all Ethereum blocks.

## Methodology in Plain English

The authors first build a formal model of one block's life. Three kinds of participants are defined: users (some benign, some attacking others' transactions for MEV), builders (who order transactions, optionally insert their own zero-gas attack transactions, and bid), and proposers (who stop the auction and take the highest bid). Each participant gets a utility function measured in gwei that adds up MEV gains, MEV losses, and gas fees, so that MEV is explicitly treated as zero-sum. Network latency is modeled as a weighted graph, meaning builders see incomplete mempools and delayed bid histories. Auctions run in discrete rounds of 0.5 seconds, capped at 24 rounds per slot, and proposers may stop the auction at any round T ≤ 24.

On top of this model they prove results with standard auction logic (the analysis builds on the English auction result that bidding up to one's valuation is dominant): which bidding strategies are dominated, what the equilibrium looks like as latency shrinks, and why MEV-extracting builders end up with higher block valuations than honest ones. Because the full system is too complex for closed-form analysis, they then run calibrated agent-based simulations using Ethereum on-chain data to observe outcomes such as the Gini coefficient of profits and the split of block value between builders and proposers. The specific simulation parameters, dataset size, and agent counts are not reported in the provided excerpt, which cuts off partway through Section 4.

## Why This Matters

**Research impact.** Prior work on PBS is largely empirical and focused on relay-based MEV-Boost, or models isolated auctions; the paper argues little work addresses ePBS directly or combines system-level formalization with simulation. This work supplies both, and turns a live protocol debate (EIP-7732) into measurable claims about inequality and manipulation.

**Real-world applications:**

- Informing the Ethereum community's ongoing debate over whether to enshrine PBS in the consensus layer, by quantifying the distributional consequences before deployment.
- Designing builder-market interventions (auction formats, bid rules, reward splits) that target builder concentration rather than proposer concentration.
- Assessing MEV mitigation proposals against a baseline that already accounts for latency and incomplete mempools.
- Evaluating the fairness cost borne by ordinary users through reordering and sandwich-style attacks, which the paper notes degrade user experience via slippage and longer confirmation times.

**Industry relevance.** Staking operators, block builders, relay providers, and validator service businesses all sit on the profit distribution the paper measures. The finding that 95.4% of block value flows to proposers under ePBS, while builders capture most MEV and concentrate, is directly relevant to business models built around block construction and to protocols weighing protocol-native versus relay-based designs. The paper also cites evidence that censored transactions suffer an average delay of 85% (from prior work), underscoring why manipulation-resistant design matters commercially as well as academically.

## Future Directions

- Mechanism designs that balance decentralization, fairness, and MEV mitigation, which the authors explicitly call for after finding that ePBS amplifies incentives for aggressive MEV strategies.
- Understanding and countering re-staking-driven accumulation, identified as the channel through which short-term profit inequality becomes long-term centralization.
- Modeling latency and network topology more fully, since the theory predicts the highest-valuation builder wins as Δ approaches 0, yet the simulations are needed precisely because real latency breaks that result.
- Vertical integration between proposers and builders, which the paper assumes away by treating proposers as benign unless integrated, and which remains an open risk to the separation ePBS is meant to enforce.

## Target Audience

Protocol researchers and mechanism designers working on Ethereum consensus and PBS/EIP-7732; MEV researchers and builders analyzing auction dynamics; academic economists and computer scientists studying auction design under latency and incomplete information; and technically sophisticated members of the staking and block-building industry who need to understand how ePBS would redistribute value. Readers should be comfortable with game-theoretic notation, utility functions, and Proof-of-Stake terminology.

## Authors’ abstract

In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), concerns about economic centralization and content manipulation have intensified. To address these vulnerabilities, the Ethereum community has introduced Proposer Builder Separation (PBS), which separates block construction…

[The full abstract on arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12989)

[Read the original paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12989)

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Canonical: https://crypto.world/paper/enshrined-proposer-builder-separation-in-the-presence-of-maximal-2601.12989
