Research
No Country for Old Privacy: The Evolving Challenges of Anonymity in Bitcoin
Bitcoin transactions are public, and simple clustering heuristics can link addresses that belong to the same user, so the anonymity early adopters expected is largely illusory.

- arXiv
- 2607.00772
- Published
- 2026-07-01
- Authors
- Ben Hawkins, Joshua Levett, Siamak F. Shahandashti
AI summary
Overview
Research area: Bitcoin privacy and anonymity — on-chain measurement of decentralised, "second-generation" anonymisation protocols (CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle, Stealth Addresses).
Technical level: Intermediate. The paper assumes familiarity with UTXOs, scripts, multi-signature and hash/time-locked contracts, but the measurement approach and findings are explained without deep cryptographic formalism.
Scope: A longitudinal, heuristic-based measurement of how often four second-generation privacy protocols appear on the Bitcoin blockchain between block 400,000 (June 2016) and block 900,000 (June 2025), and how their detectable usage correlates with major regulatory, market and technical events.
What This Paper Is About
Bitcoin transactions are public, and simple clustering heuristics can link addresses that belong to the same user, so the anonymity early adopters expected is largely illusory. A "second generation" of decentralised privacy protocols emerged to fix this without the trust problems of centralised mixers, but nobody had measured how widely these protocols were actually used since Möser and Böhme's 2016 study, which covered the chain only up to block 418,722. The authors rebuild and refine on-chain detection heuristics for CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses, count their prevalence across nine years of blocks, and overlay the resulting time series on seven notable real-world events to see whether adoption responds to regulation, upgrades and market shocks.
Key Contributions
- The first longitudinal study of second-generation Bitcoin privacy protocol adoption since 2016, extending coverage from block height 400,000 (June 2016) to 900,000 (June 2025) and aggregating counts over 1,008-block periods (roughly one week).
- A reproducible, on-chain-only measurement pipeline: a locally downloaded Bitcoin Core chain parsed with
rusty-blockparserinto four CSVs, pruned and rebuilt as a DuckDB database queried through Python, with all SQL heuristics published in a public repository. The authors deliberately avoid proprietary tools such as Chainalysis and Elliptic because those rely on off-chain data and models that change over time, which undermines longitudinal consistency. - A comparison of refined heuristic filters across protocols, including three successive iterations for Stealth Address detection and a documented account of why the first was too strict (roughly 5,000 matches) and the second too noisy.
- An event-aligned analysis (Events A–G) linking detectable protocol activity to SegWit, the 2020 halving, Taproot, the Terra/Luna collapse, the first Ordinals inscription, BlackRock's trust filing, and the FBI warning on unregistered money-transmitting services.
Main Findings
- CoinJoin is detected but stays niche: 5,948,184 CoinJoin transactions were identified across the study period, with relative adoption consistently fluctuating between 0% and 0.8% of total Bitcoin transactions, matching Möser and Böhme's sub-1% finding.
- CoinJoin activity is episodic, then disappears: usage spiked to isolated peaks of 2.5% of network transactions after the BlackRock filing (Event F), dropped to zero at one point, and a steady decline was cemented in 2024 around the FBI warning (Event G); no further CoinJoin activity was detected shortly after Event G.
- A possible "last call" effect: a spike at the 830k block range is attributed to a possible direct reaction to intensifying regulatory warnings (Event G) together with anticipation of spot Bitcoin ETF approval (Event F), rather than immediate suppression of activity.
- CoinSwap counts are higher but mean fewer users: 23,321,415 CoinSwap transactions were detected versus roughly 5.94 million CoinJoin transactions, but because CoinJoin aggregates around 50 participants per transaction (versus 2 for CoinSwap), the figures translate to roughly 300 million participant-uses for CoinJoin versus 46 million for CoinSwap, meaning CoinJoin serves about 6.5 times more users.
- CoinSwap detection collapses at SegWit: initial adoption peaked at 17% of all transactions (around 351 transactions per block), higher than the upper bounds proposed by Möser and Böhme, then settled to 20–30 transactions per block after SegWit activation. The authors attribute the drop to their heuristic detecting
op_checkmultisig(hexae) inscriptPubKey/scriptSig, which native SegWit moves into a witness field the pipeline does not parse; residual detections are judged likely to be non-privacy uses of 2-of-2 multisig such as coloured coins. - CoinShuffle activity tracks the Wasabi wallet: detected CoinShuffle volume mirrors Wasabi's operational timeline, because Wasabi's coordinator-based implementation produces on-chain structures functionally identical to CoinShuffle. First discernible activity appears around block 600k (late 2019), peaks around block 730k (early 2022), and terminates abruptly at block 843,500 (May 2024) with the public shutdown of Wasabi's coordination service, shortly after Event G.
- Stealth addresses show no standardised adoption: the strict first heuristic returned roughly 5,000 matches clustered in three short-lived peaks of about one week each, indicative of anomalous events or non-stealth data embedding; the second, relaxed heuristic produced many detections that correlated with unrelated events such as Ordinals inscriptions, indicating false positives from generic
%02%and%03%prefixes matching hex-encoded inscriptions; the third heuristic, targeting the exact BIP47 footprint, returned no transactions across the entire studied block range. - A resolved paradox: the authors treat the null BIP47 result as genuine absence rather than detection failure, and read it as empirical support for the claim that a lack of standardisation is a critical barrier to privacy technology adoption, while conceding implementations may have evolved beyond detectable means.
- No protocol substitution: protocol shares remain roughly stable relative to one another, suggesting users do not switch between protocols when one declines; each occupies a stable niche, and CoinJoin remains the preferred technique, likely because it was among the first trustless protocols with low technical overhead.
- Ordinals changed the network's character: from around block 780k there is a significant increase in average transactions per block, attributed to the Ordinals phenomenon (first inscription at block 767,430), with a coupled spike in fees. The authors describe a dual effect: economic crowding out of multi-transaction privacy techniques, and added anonymity-set noise that also complicates on-chain analysis.
Methodology in Plain English
The authors downloaded the full Bitcoin blockchain with Bitcoin Core (96 hours, 780 GiB), parsed it with rusty-blockparser into CSV files for blocks, transactions, inputs and outputs (12 hours on an 8-core Intel i7-7700 with 16 GiB RAM, a further 1.3 TB of storage), then loaded a pruned subset into DuckDB so they could run fast SQL queries.
For each protocol they wrote pattern-matching rules that capture its unavoidable on-chain signature. CoinJoin needs at least two participants, at least four outputs, and inputs numbering at least half the outputs. CoinSwap needs two 2-of-2 multi-signature transactions, addresses that do not fund each other, output value leniency of 0.0002 btc for fees (tighter than the 0.002 btc used previously, to reflect the higher bitcoin price), no op_return outputs, and completion before locktime expiry. CoinShuffle needs at least three participants, an exact match between input and output counts, and outputs of near-identical value. Stealth addresses went through three iterations before settling on exact byte-level matching of the BIP47 Reusable Payment Code structure in the op_return field.
Counts were normalised against total transactions per period and aggregated over 1,008 blocks. Prior results from Möser and Böhme were used as a sanity check on the implementations. Separately, the authors built a list of seven events by consulting Bitcoin Magazine's historical timelines, then researching each candidate across r/CryptoCurrency, r/Bitcoin, r/Privacy and bitcointalk.com, keeping those marked by controversy or perceived threat to Bitcoin's value or privacy.
Why This Matters
Impact on research: The work fills a nine-year gap in longitudinal measurement of Bitcoin privacy tooling and shows how sensitive such measurements are to heuristic design and to protocol changes like SegWit, which can silently blind a detector. It also supplies an open, reproducible SQL pipeline where most comparable work is either older or limited to two specific wallets (as with Stütz et al.'s study of Wasabi and Samourai over blocks 530k–725k).
Real-world applications:
- Compliance and forensic teams can use the reported detection rates and their failure modes to calibrate what on-chain heuristics can and cannot see, and to avoid over-reading a drop in detections as a drop in privacy demand.
- Wallet developers and protocol designers get evidence that non-standardised features (as with Stealth Addresses/BIP47) fail to achieve adoption, supporting convergence on a small number of shared standards to build larger anonymity sets.
- Policymakers and regulators can see that enforcement-adjacent events coincide with measurable reductions in detectable privacy activity, with no accompanying evidence of reduced demand.
- Researchers building privacy metrics gain a documented template for event-aligned time-series analysis and for reporting heuristic limitations honestly.
Industry relevance: The finding that CoinShuffle-style volume begins with Wasabi's rise and ends at block 843,500 with its coordination service shutdown, shortly after the FBI warning, illustrates how directly regulatory pressure can affect even non-custodial privacy infrastructure. For exchanges, custodians and analysts, the broader implication is that the visible privacy ecosystem is a shrinking minority of activity, so absence of detected mixing is weak evidence that funds were not mixed.
Future Directions
- Determine whether the 2024 drop in detectable privacy activity reflects a genuine fall in user demand, a migration to less detectable Bitcoin methods (the authors cite Taproot-based protocols), or a migration to privacy-focused coins such as Monero or Zcash.
- Run dual-chain or multi-chain analysis of usage trends on Monero, Zcash and Bitcoin side by side to confirm or reject the migration hypothesis.
- Extend monitoring to newer ecosystems, specifically the Lightning Network and Taproot, which the authors name as targets for future work.
- Obtain ground truth — for example by participating in protocol instances — to compute false positive and false negative rates, which the paper states could not be established; and establish causality rather than temporal correlation for Events A–G.
Target Audience
Blockchain privacy researchers and measurement scientists; Bitcoin protocol and wallet developers weighing standardisation decisions; blockchain analytics and compliance practitioners who need to understand the limits of heuristic detection; and graduate students in cryptography and security looking for a clear example of longitudinal on-chain empirical work with openly documented methodological caveats. Readers without basic Bitcoin background (UTXOs, scripts, multisig, locktimes) will need to consult the background section carefully before the results.
Authors’ abstract
We present a longitudinal measurement study on the adoption of detectable, second-generation anonymisation protocols in the Bitcoin network, including CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses. By implementing and refining a suite of heuristic filters, we identify over 5.94 million CoinJoin and 23.3 million CoinSwap transactions. Besides, the use of CoinShuffle was unexpectedly found to be closely aligned with the Wasabi wallet operation period. Our analysis…
The full abstract on arXiv