# Open vs. Sealed: Auction Format Choice for Maximal Extractable Value

Crypto.world

> Block builders on Ethereum auction valuable transaction-ordering opportunities to competing "searchers," and these auctions move tens of millions of dollars per year.

**arXiv**: 2603.16333

**Published**: 2026-03-17

**Authors**: Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta, Andrei Sebyakin, Arsenii Valitov

## AI summary

## Overview

**Research area:** Market design and mechanism choice for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) auctions on Ethereum — crossing auction theory (q-fin.TR) with empirical blockchain data analysis.

**Technical level:** Intermediate. The paper uses standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium derivations (first-order conditions, order statistics, the Milgrom–Weber linkage principle) and maximum-likelihood fitting of a log-normal distribution, but presents them as a structured comparison rather than a deep technical proof paper.

**One-sentence scope:** The paper asks which auction format a block builder should use to sell MEV opportunities, combining 2.2 million Ethereum MEV transactions with a Gaussian-copula model of affiliated searcher valuations to rank five auction formats by expected revenue.

## What This Paper Is About

Block builders on Ethereum auction valuable transaction-ordering opportunities to competing "searchers," and these auctions move tens of millions of dollars per year. The authors ask a mechanism-design question that has received little attention: given what MEV values actually look like in practice, does the choice of auction format (English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid, or all-pay) materially change how much revenue the auctioneer captures? The goal is to show that because MEV valuations are heavy-tailed, heterogeneous across MEV types, and *affiliated* (correlated across bidders), the classical Revenue Equivalence Theorem fails — and to quantify how much money the "wrong" format leaves on the table.

## Key Contributions

1. **An empirical characterization of MEV value and competition.** Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions from three orderflow providers (Blink, Merkle, and MEV Blocker) covering September 2024 to August 2025, the authors show extracted values are log-normal (MLE: μ̂ = 1.102, σ̂ = 2.524) with extreme right-tail concentration, and that competition intensity — measured by a new "bribe percentage" feature — varies sharply by MEV type.
2. **An affiliation-aware equilibrium framework spanning five auction formats.** Searchers' valuations are modeled as draws from a log-normal marginal linked by a Gaussian common factor, giving an affiliation parameter ρ, with equilibrium bidding strategies and expected revenues derived across a fine grid of bidder counts n and ρ.
3. **A quantitative ranking of formats and a dollar estimate of the stakes.** English and second-price sealed-bid auctions strictly dominate Dutch and first-price sealed-bid formats for any ρ > 0, and the authors translate the resulting linkage gap into an estimated $10–18 million in foregone revenue over the sample period.
4. **A novel non-monotonicity in the affiliation parameter.** At large n and high ρ, revenue peaks in the *interior* of the affiliation space and then declines, because near-perfect correlation collapses the order-statistic spread that generates competitive payments.

## Main Findings

- **Log-normal values with a very heavy tail.** Fitted parameters are μ̂ = 1.102 and σ̂ = 2.524; a one-standard-deviation upward shift in the latent signal multiplies extracted value by roughly e^2.524 ≈ 12.5. The empirical distribution spans from below 10⁻⁵ to above 10⁷ USDC.
- **Extreme concentration.** The top 1% of transactions generate 68% of total revenue; the top 10% generate 90%. The Gini coefficient is 0.933. Mechanism choice is therefore decided by a thin set of high-value events.
- **Competition differs dramatically by MEV type.** Sandwich attacks show an average bribe percentage of 95% (searchers bid away nearly all surplus), backruns 76%, naked arbitrage 67%, and liquidations 68%. The pooled average is 79%.
- **Scale and composition of the sample.** Total extracted value is approximately $168.5M: sandwiches $66.5M across 890,967 transactions, naked arbitrage $52.6M across 915,194, backruns $28.2M across 405,701, and liquidations $21.2M across 4,759 transactions. Liquidations are rare but individually large (median $157.3 versus $3.01 pooled).
- **Revenue equivalence holds only without affiliation.** Under independent private values (ρ = 0), all five formats satisfy revenue equivalence, confirmed by Monte Carlo verification.
- **A strict ranking emerges under affiliation.** English and second-price sealed-bid dominate Dutch and first-price sealed-bid, which in turn dominate all-pay — consistent with the Milgrom–Weber linkage principle. At ρ = 0.5 with n = 5 bidders, English and SPSB yield revenues 17% higher than Dutch and FPSB, and all-pay falls 41% below the FPSB baseline.
- **The linkage gap is large and largest for few bidders.** The gap is 14–28% at moderate affiliation (ρ = 0.5) and up to 30% for small bidder counts. Because small n corresponds to MEV categories like liquidations and naked arbitrage — precisely those where searchers retain the most surplus — format choice matters most where the money is.
- **Dollar impact on the observed data.** Switching from a first-price to a second-price or English format would have raised auctioneer revenues by between 3.3% and 32.0%, or roughly $10–18 million over the sample period, with magnitude sensitive to the assumed ρ and n.
- **Non-monotonic revenue in ρ at high n.** Revenue rises, peaks in the interior of the affiliation parameter space, and then falls as correlation approaches one, because the gap between the highest and second-highest valuations — the source of competitive payment — shrinks.

## Methodology in Plain English

The authors proceed in three layers.

**Empirical layer.** They take a public dataset of MEV "bundles" (packaged transactions that searchers submit for inclusion), compute for each transaction the *extracted value* — the tip paid to the builder plus the searcher's own retained profit — and derive a *bribe percentage* (tip divided by extracted value) as a proxy for how fiercely that MEV category is contested. They then fit a log-normal distribution by maximum likelihood and describe concentration using a Pareto curve and a Gini coefficient.

**Theoretical layer.** They set up a standard single-object auction with n symmetric, risk-neutral searchers whose valuations follow that fitted log-normal distribution. For each of five formats they derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding function — for instance, the first-price bid equals the expected highest rival value conditional on winning, while the second-price format makes truthful bidding a weakly dominant strategy. They then derive expected revenue as a function of order statistics of the valuation distribution.

**Affiliation layer and simulation.** To break revenue equivalence, they let valuations share a common random factor (a Gaussian copula construction with correlation parameter ρ), so that when an opportunity is good for one searcher it tends to be good for others — matching the fact that all searchers observe the same on-chain state and price signals. Because closed forms are unavailable for log-normal order statistics, they compute expected revenues numerically over a fine grid of n and ρ, and then apply the resulting percentage gaps to the actual observed bribe totals to get dollar figures.

## Why This Matters

**For research:** The paper provides an empirical case where a textbook result (Revenue Equivalence) fails for a measurable, economically important reason — affiliation — and it does so with real data rather than a stylized example. It also adds a new theoretical observation (the interior revenue peak in ρ) that qualifies the usual "more correlation is better for the seller" intuition behind the linkage principle.

**Real-world applications:**

- **Block builders and orderflow providers** choosing a mechanism for selling bundle inclusion rights can use the format ranking and the 3.3%–32.0% revenue range as a prior for redesign.
- **MEV category segmentation:** auction formats could be applied selectively by MEV type, since sandwich auctions (95% bribe rate, large n) and liquidation auctions (68%, small n) sit in very different regions of the (n, ρ) space.
- **Protocol and rollup designers** picking auction rules — the paper discusses Arbitrum Timeboost (second-price sealed-bid) and Polygon Atlas (first-price sealed-bid) — can interpret their choices through this linkage-gap lens.
- **Market concentration analysis:** the finding that the linkage gap is largest at small n implies that thin markets, where a handful of specialized searchers compete, are exactly where mechanism design has the most leverage.

**Industry relevance:** The estimated $10–18 million in foregone revenue over roughly one year of data is a concrete, order-of-magnitude figure for an industry that runs these auctions continuously. The bribe-percentage statistic also gives practitioners a simple competition-intensity diagnostic they can compute directly from bundle data.

## Future Directions

- **Type-specific estimation.** The authors explicitly flag that they pool all four MEV types into one valuation distribution for tractability, and propose estimating separate log-normal parameters and rerunning the revenue simulations per MEV category.
- **Better distributional fit.** The pooled fit shows slight excess kurtosis relative to the fitted normal in the left tail (visible below log v ≈ −5), suggesting heavier-tailed or mixture specifications may be warranted.
- **Endogenizing n and ρ from data.** The paper maps MEV types to qualitative ranges of n and ρ (large n for sandwiches, small n for liquidations) rather than estimating them; a natural next step is to identify these parameters empirically so the dollar estimates become tighter than the stated range.
- **Beyond static symmetric equilibrium.** The related work cited in the paper finds that history-conditioned reinforcement-learning agents capture 49% of available profits alongside existing searchers and 81% when replacing the market leader, outperforming static game-theoretic bidding — raising the open question of how the format ranking changes under learning, latency constraints, and partial observability of the kind found in real bundle auctions.

## Target Audience

Researchers and practitioners in market design, blockchain economics, and DeFi infrastructure: auction theorists interested in an applied affiliation setting with unusually clean data; block builders, relays, and orderflow providers deciding on mechanism design; and quantitatively inclined readers in the MEV/block-building ecosystem who want a rigorous but accessible treatment of why the auction format for extractable value is not a neutral choice.

## Authors’ abstract

We study optimal auction design for Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) auction markets on Ethereum. Using a dataset of 2.2 million transactions across three major orderflow providers, we establish three empirical regularities: extracted values follow a log-normal distribution with extreme right-tail concentration, competition intensity varies substantially across MEV types, and the standard Revenue Equivalence Theorem breaks down due to affiliation among searchers' valuations.…

[The full abstract on arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.16333)

[Read the original paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.16333)

---

Canonical: https://crypto.world/paper/open-vs-sealed-auction-format-choice-for-maximal-extractable-value-2603.16333
