Research
Ordering Power is Sanctioning Power: Sanction Evasion-MEV and the Limits of On-Chain Enforcement
Centralized stablecoin issuers such as Tether and Circle can blacklist addresses, and regulators treat this freeze power as sufficient for sanctions enforcement.

- arXiv
- 2603.27739
- Published
- 2026-03-29
- Authors
- Di Wu, Yuman Bai, Shoupeng Ren, Xinyu Zhang, Yiyue Cao, Xuechao Wang, Wu Wen, Jian Liu
AI summary
Overview
Research area: Blockchain security and crypto-asset regulation, specifically the intersection of stablecoin sanctions enforcement, transaction-ordering economics (MEV), and mechanism design on Ethereum.
Technical level: Intermediate to Advanced. The empirical half is accessible to anyone who understands ERC-20 tokens and Ethereum transaction mechanics; the game-theoretic half assumes comfort with equilibrium analysis and mechanism design.
Scope: A measurement-plus-theory study of how the race between issuer freeze transactions and sanctioned parties' transfer transactions on Ethereum turns sanctions enforcement into a contest over transaction ordering, quantified on a dataset of USDT and USDC sanctions from November 2017 to August 2025.
What This Paper Is About
Centralized stablecoin issuers such as Tether and Circle can blacklist addresses, and regulators treat this freeze power as sufficient for sanctions enforcement. The paper shows that a blacklist call is just an ordinary on-chain transaction, so when a sanctioned party submits a competing transfer for the same block, the winner is decided by block producers acting on fees rather than by legal authority.
The authors measure how often sanctioned balances were already emptied before freezes took effect, characterize how evasion bidding escalated over time, and build a game-theoretic model of the resulting rent extraction, which they call Sanction-Evasion MEV (SE-MEV).
Key Contributions
-
Problem definition. The paper defines "reactive on-chain sanctions" — cases where the evader's transfer and the issuer's freeze are triggered by the same public signal — and identifies the disconnect between contract-layer authority and ordering-layer enforcement as a system-level security limitation.
-
Empirical measurement. It constructs the first longitudinal sanctions dataset for Ethereum USDT and USDC (2017-11-28 to 2025-08-31), covering more than $1.5 billion in frozen value, and quantifies the gap between nominal blacklist actions and value actually frozen.
-
Mechanism identification. It introduces the concept of SE-MEV and reports the first empirical evidence that ordering-layer actors extract MEV from the priority race between sanctioning and evading parties, tracing an escalation from issuer-side out-of-gas failures through public gas auctions and private order flow to direct payments to block producers.
-
Equilibrium analysis. It develops a game-theoretic model of stablecoin sanctions that incorporates MEV, showing that the implicit enforcement tax grows without bound as regulatory penalties intensify, and identifying structural incentives for issuers to vertically integrate into block-building infrastructure.
Main Findings
-
Sanctioned addresses were often already empty. At least 7.3% of sanctioned USDT addresses and at least 18.7% of sanctioned USDC addresses had been drained to zero by the time the freeze took effect. In address terms, 146 USDT addresses (7.34%) held zero balance and a further 250 (12.56%) held less than $1,000; for USDC, 23 addresses (18.7%) held zero and 7 (5.69%) held less than $1,000.
-
Frozen value is large but concentrated. USDT sanctions froze $1,411,842,932.22 and USDC sanctions froze $108,250,166.32, for more than $1.5 billion in aggregate. A separate $24,808,527 of USDT was destroyed via
destroyBlackFundsin issuer-driven recovery workflows. -
Most on-chain sanctions have no public OFAC anchor. Only 26 USDT and 15 USDC sanctioned addresses link to the OFAC SDN list; 121 USDT and 18 USDC addresses connect to litigation records via CourtListener; 431 USDT and 30 USDC addresses were labeled phishing-like based on repeated zero-value transfers. Over 94% of on-chain sanctions were initiated without a corresponding public OFAC designation.
-
Last-moment races are rare but high-value. Using a fitted Gaussian Mixture Model (k = 30 selected by BIC over k in [1, 50]) on log(Δ), the authors split evasion into four regimes: Race (Δ ≤ 242 seconds), Tactical reactive (242 s < Δ ≤ 26.5 hours), Strategic migration (26.5 hours < Δ ≤ 88 days) and Long-tail (Δ > 88 days). Only 9 Race episodes appear for USDT and none for USDC, yet their median outflow is $3.83M, roughly 50× the $64K–$70K medians of the tactical-reactive and strategic-migration regimes.
-
Capital flight happens long before enforcement. Strategic migration dominates: for USDT alone it comprises 6,232 episodes across 517 unique addresses, accounting for $1.5B in pre-sanction outflows.
-
Evasion escalated up the MEV supply chain. The paper documents a trajectory from issuer-side out-of-gas failures, to public gas auctions, to private order flow, and finally to direct payments to block producers — evidence that block producers extract MEV from sanction enforcement.
-
Compliance forces issuers into the ordering market. In the model, a compliant issuer cannot rationally stay outside the ordering market once evasion is possible.
-
Fixed costs concentrate evasion. Participation costs push evasion toward a small set of specialized, MEV-aware adversaries rather than a broad population.
-
The MEV tax is unbounded. The implicit tax extracted by block producers grows without bound as regulatory penalties intensify, which in turn creates persistent incentives for issuers to vertically integrate into block-building — pressuring blockchain neutrality.
-
The problem generalizes. The same conflict arises whenever a privileged on-chain action must be executed as an ordinary transaction, such as emergency pauses, governance interventions or judicial freezes.
Methodology in Plain English
The authors built a four-phase data pipeline. They pulled every USDT and USDC blacklist event and destroyBlackFunds call from Ethereum archive data in Google BigQuery from the USDT contract creation date (2017-11-28 12:41:21 UTC) through 2025-08-31 23:59:59 UTC, yielding 2,418 sanctioned USDT addresses and 341 USDC addresses.
They then cleaned the set twice. First, they dropped addresses whose sanctions were later revoked and USDT addresses blacklisted only to recover mistakenly sent funds (a freeze, destroy, re-issue sequence), leaving a Sanctioned Entity Dataset of 2,066 USDT and 239 USDC addresses. Second, they removed addresses that cannot meaningfully be called evaders — shared infrastructure such as mixer contracts and exchange deposit aggregation clusters, plus addresses that never held any stablecoin — leaving the Adversarial Evasion Dataset of 1,990 USDT and 123 USDC addresses.
To decide what counts as an evasion attempt rather than ordinary usage, they grouped each address's transactions into time-contiguous "intent episodes," using a threshold of 107 seconds derived from the first low point of a kernel density estimate of inter-transaction gaps. They kept only episodes moving at least $1,000 (the FATF Travel Rule benchmark) and at least 10% of the address's available liquidity during the episode. This produced 18,432 economically meaningful episodes.
For timing, they anchored everything to the block at which the blacklist actually took effect, and measured Δ, the gap between an episode's final outflow and enforcement. For USDT they also reconstructed the multisig workflow, separating the on-chain submission time of a blacklist proposal from its later execution time. To study bidding behavior they compared fees paid by issuers and evaders against the median effective fee in the same block, aggregated mempool archives (Blocknative, 2019-01-11 to 2025-01-03; Flashbots Mempool Dumpster, 2023-07-08 to 2025-08-31) for first-seen timestamps, and used private-transaction flags plus direct ETH transfers to block producers' fee-recipient addresses as evidence of private order flow and proposer payments.
On top of the measurement, they wrote a game-theoretic model in which an issuer, an evader and a profit-maximizing block producer interact repeatedly under regulatory penalties, and solved for equilibrium behavior and the resulting rent transfer.
Why This Matters
Impact on research. The paper reframes sanctions enforcement from a compliance question into an ordering-market question, and gives the MEV literature a new value source — SE-MEV — that is driven by regulatory conflict rather than by arbitrage or liquidations. It also opens a measurement agenda: the dataset links on-chain enforcement traces to regulatory records, which prior work did not do.
Real-world applications:
- Stablecoin issuers can use the race and regime analysis to decide how aggressively to route freeze transactions through private channels or pay for priority, and to budget for that recurring cost.
- Regulators and compliance teams can reassess whether blacklist authority alone satisfies sanctions obligations, since contract-layer authority is shown to be necessary but not sufficient.
- Exchanges, custodians and analytics firms can use the phishing-like and CourtListener-linked labeling to improve address risk scoring around enforcement events.
- Protocol designers of emergency pauses, upgrade mechanisms or governance interventions can generalize the finding to any privileged action that must be submitted as an ordinary transaction.
Industry relevance. The result that issuers face structural incentives to vertically integrate into block-building touches directly on concerns about builder centralization and credible neutrality of Ethereum's proposer-builder separation supply chain. The escalation to direct proposer payments is likewise relevant to anyone monitoring block-building market conduct.
Future Directions
- Extending the measurement beyond Ethereum and beyond USDT and USDC, since the authors note that USDC races were absent in their data partly because of its smaller sanction footprint, and that non-U.S. sanctions are outside their primary scope.
- Quantifying off-chain side payments and other bilateral arrangements between evaders and block producers, which the paper explicitly lists as unobservable within its framework and therefore outside its measurements.
- Testing the model's prediction of issuer vertical integration into block-building empirically, for instance by tracking whether issuer-affiliated entities appear in builder or proposer roles.
- Determining whether the escalation trajectory — out-of-gas failures, public gas auctions, private order flow, direct proposer payments — holds for other privileged on-chain actions such as emergency pauses, governance interventions and judicial freezes.
Target Audience
Researchers in blockchain security, MEV and mechanism design; stablecoin issuer compliance and engineering teams; financial regulators and sanctions policy analysts; and blockchain analytics practitioners. Readers wanting only the empirical picture can focus on Sections 4 and 5, while those interested in the systemic argument will need the game-theoretic section.
Authors’ abstract
Centralized stablecoins such as USDT and USDC enforce sanctions through contract-layer blacklist functions. Yet on public blockchains, a freeze is still an ordinary transaction competing with the sanctioned party's transfer for priority. It exposes a gap between contract-layer authority and ordering-layer enforcement: when both race for the same block, the outcome is set not by legal mandate, but by block producers' choices. Because both sides can pay for priority, sanction…
The full abstract on arXiv