# SuperPaymaster: Eliminating Centralized Signer Authority via Asset-Oriented Abstraction to Reconcile Usability and Decentralization in Account Abstraction

Crypto.world

> Most production ERC-4337 Paymasters work by having a centralized off-chain server sign every sponsorship request, which makes that server a censorship chokepoint: if it goes offline or refuses a…

**arXiv**: 2605.05774

**Published**: 2026-05-07

**Authors**: Huifeng Jiao, Nathapon Udomlertsakul

## AI summary

## Overview

**Research area:** Account abstraction on Ethereum L2s — specifically ERC-4337 Paymaster design, gas-payment UX, and the decentralization of sponsorship authority. Published under arXiv category Cryptography and Security (arXiv:2605.05774v2 [cs.CR], 26 May 2026) by Huifeng Jiao and Nathapon Udomlertsakul, International College of Digital Innovation (ICDI), Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

**Technical level:** Intermediate. The paper is readable without deep protocol expertise, but it assumes familiarity with ERC-4337 vocabulary (UserOperation, Bundler, EntryPoint, `validatePaymasterUserOp`, `postOp`) and with basic gas accounting.

**Scope:** The paper defines Asset-Oriented Abstraction (AOA) as a design paradigm, implements it as the SuperPaymaster artifact deployed on Optimism Mainnet, and evaluates it on decentralization (code structure and on-chain evidence), usability (analytical GOMS modeling), and gas efficiency against two industry paymaster baselines with n = 50 single-UserOp ERC-20 transfers per system.

## What This Paper Is About

Most production ERC-4337 Paymasters work by having a centralized off-chain server sign every sponsorship request, which makes that server a censorship chokepoint: if it goes offline or refuses a user, the user cannot transact. The authors argue this pattern — which they call Process-Oriented Abstraction (POA) — abstracts a payment *process* inside a narrow context rather than giving the user a reusable payment *capability*. Their goal is to move the "who is allowed to be sponsored" decision entirely on-chain by encapsulating it in a persistent, user-owned asset — a non-transferable Soulbound Token called a Gas Card — so that no off-chain signer is required for a sponsorship to be valid.

## Key Contributions

1. **Conceptual:** A formal definition of Asset-Oriented Abstraction (AOA) as a design principle, positioned against POA, with three principles (Assetization, Decentralization via Ownership, Universal Mental Model) and three corresponding technical requirements (Assetization, User-Ownership, Deterministic Verification). AOA is framed as relocating where sponsorship authority resides, not as a replacement for ERC-4337.
2. **Artifact:** The open-source SuperPaymaster system, comprising on-chain contracts (Registry, SuperPaymaster, PaymasterV4, Gas Card SBT, xPNTsFactory, optional BLS Aggregator), two token standards (the OpenCards SBT-based Gas Card standard and the OpenPNTs gas-token standard enabling permissionless community issuance), and an SDK. It ships in two deployment modes: **PaymasterV4**, a self-deployable single-community paymaster, and **SuperPaymaster**, a multi-community shared public-infrastructure layer built on the same AOA core.
3. **Zero-Approve Gas Token Architecture:** xPNTs tokens return `type(uint256).max` from `allowance()` for trusted contracts (SuperPaymaster, Factory, MySBT), removing the separate approval transaction, and settle gas internally (burn xPNTs, transfer aPNTs to treasury) instead of routing through an on-chain DEX swap. A `transferFrom()` firewall and a `MAX_SINGLE_TX_LIMIT` of 5,000 ether in token units act as safeguards.
4. **Evaluation:** A multi-method evaluation on Optimism Mainnet (n = 50 per system) combining code structural analysis of `validatePaymasterUserOp` and on-chain transaction evidence for decentralization, GOMS analytical modeling for usability, and receipt-level gas profiling with trace-level decomposition, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (10,000 resamples), and Cliff's delta effect sizes against Alchemy Gas Manager and Pimlico ERC-20 paymaster.

## Main Findings

- **Lower pure L2 execution gas than both baselines:** In `txGasUsed`, SuperPaymaster recorded 167,830 gas versus Alchemy Gas Manager at 205,951 and Pimlico ERC-20 paymaster at 328,937, for single-UserOp ERC-20 transfers on Optimism Mainnet (n = 50 per system).
- **49% reduction versus Pimlico:** The paper attributes this reduction to replacing on-chain token liquidation with an internal balance update, and reports that Pimlico's ERC-20 path varies between 226k and 638k gas because of its on-chain token swap while SuperPaymaster stays consistently near 167,830 gas.
- **~32,000-gas verification overhead versus Alchemy:** SuperPaymaster still pays this on-chain verification cost relative to the lightweight off-chain ECDSA path; `validatePaymasterUserOp` consumes approximately 48,625 gas for SuperPaymaster versus roughly 16,000 gas for the off-chain ECDSA check in industry API-signature paymasters such as Alchemy Gas Manager.
- **Higher total billed gas than Alchemy:** On total billed gas, SuperPaymaster recorded 286,818 versus Alchemy's 257,299. The authors attribute the gap to higher bundler PVG overhead rather than to paymaster architecture (the paper defines `actualGasUsed = txGasUsed + PVG`).
- **~13k gas delta within the AOA family:** PaymasterV4 consumes roughly 35,549 gas in `validatePaymasterUserOp`, so the ~13k difference isolates the added cost of SuperPaymaster's SBT eligibility, rate-limit, and credit-state logic over the single-community mode.
- **No off-chain signer in the validity path:** Code structural analysis and on-chain Mainnet evidence confirm that `validatePaymasterUserOp` reads only paymaster-self storage, so sponsorship validity requires no off-chain signing server. To stay ERC-4337 / ERC-7562 validation-compatible, the deployed v3.2.2 contract on Optimism Mainnet mirrors SBT status into an internal `sbtHolders` mapping and caches the ETH/aPNTs price in a `cachedPrice` struct (Chainlink oracle as primary source, with a DVT-run keeper fallback aggregating Chainlink, Binance, OKX, and Uniswap V3 via BLS signatures).
- **Validation cost attribution:** Stage-level analysis reports that operator-configuration reads from the Registry contribute roughly 5k gas cumulatively, and that the internal ledger settlement is an O(1) storage write of about 5k gas, versus roughly 100k+ gas for a DEX swap sequence.
- **Market concentration motivates the problem:** Citing BundleBear, the paper reports that a single paymaster provider processes over 71% of all sponsored UserOperations by operation count, while the top three providers account for over 62% of total gas spend.
- **Stated cost savings from Zero-Approve:** The paper estimates ~46,000 gas saved per first interaction from eliminating `approve()` and ~150,000 gas from avoiding the on-chain swap in `postOp`.
- **Usability results are not reported in the provided excerpt:** The paper specifies a GOMS-based analytical evaluation for proposition P2 and three dependent variables (Interaction Steps, Total Time, Total Cost), but the truncated content above does not contain the resulting GOMS figures. The 95% confidence intervals and Cliff's delta values are likewise not given numerically in this excerpt.

## Methodology in Plain English

The authors follow Design Science Research (Peffers et al.), anchored by Hevner's seven design-science guidelines and the FEDS evaluation framework of Venable et al. In FEDS terms their evaluation is ex-post (on a deployed artifact), artificial (controlled test harnesses and selected mainnet UserOps rather than broad in-the-wild usage), and summative.

Concretely, they built the system, deployed it on Optimism Mainnet, and ran the same simple task — an ERC-20 token transfer — 50 times per system. They compared three things: a plain externally-owned-account transfer (used only as qualitative grounding, since its execution path is not directly comparable to a UserOperation), two commercial ERC-4337 paymasters (Alchemy Gas Manager as an API-verified representative and Pimlico as a DEX-routed ERC-20 paymaster representative, sampled from on-chain `UserOperationEvent` logs filtered for single-UserOp bundles with the ERC-20 `transfer` selector), and SuperPaymaster. They also ran a second internal configuration, PaymasterV4, as a cost-decomposition baseline.

To answer the decentralization question, they did not run a statistical test: they inspected the contract code to check whether any off-chain `ecrecover` appears in the validation path and cross-checked against real mainnet transactions. Because gas values are deterministic on-chain measurements tied to a specific harness, they treat them as engineering measurements rather than hypothesis tests, reporting descriptive statistics, bootstrap 95% confidence intervals from 10,000 resamples, Cliff's delta with standard thresholds, and skewness/excess kurtosis; non-overlapping 95% CIs between systems are taken as evidence of a robust difference. They frame the study as three propositions (P1 signer-gate removal, P2 analytical usability improvement, P3 comprehensive-cost trade-off) rather than formal hypotheses.

## Why This Matters

**Impact on research:** The paper supplies a vocabulary — Asset-Oriented versus Process-Oriented Abstraction — for a distinction that is usually discussed only implicitly, and it quantifies the price of moving sponsorship authorization on-chain. It makes a forward-compatibility argument that matters for the research agenda: Native AA proposals (RIP-7560 with RIP-7711 and RIP-7712, EIP-7701, and the draft EIP-8141 Frame Transaction discussed for Glamsterdam) absorb the bundler role but remain silent on who decides sponsorship eligibility, so the paymaster-signer authority question persists regardless of the Native AA timeline.

**Real-world applications:**

- **Community and DAO gas sponsorship:** A DAO, game, or wallet can deploy xPNTs and a paymaster operator permissionlessly, and users holding a Gas Card can access sponsorship from any such community.
- **Wallet onboarding in regions with fiat on-ramp friction:** The Bootstrapping Paradox defense argues cards are self-minted directly from the MySBT protocol contract with no community authorization, avoiding the centralized-exchange/KYC path normally needed to obtain ETH.
- **Censorship-resistant sponsorship for public goods or airdrops:** Eligibility becomes deterministic on-chain state (SBT ownership plus configured token policy), so no operator can selectively refuse a user.
- **Cost-sensitive L2 deployments:** The Zero-Approve path removes both the approval transaction and the DEX swap for any team building a paymaster on an OP Stack chain.

**Industry relevance:** The market-concentration data (over 71% of sponsored UserOps by operation count through one provider; over 62% of gas spend through the top three) frames paymaster centralization as a systemic risk analogous to MEV centralization. The paper is also candid about the commercial trade-off: it beats both baselines on pure L2 execution gas but loses to Alchemy on total billed gas because of bundler overhead, not because of its own architecture.

## Future Directions

- **Credit mode (T2):** The paper states that SuperPaymaster's credit mode is studied in a companion paper, and only the normal mode (T2.1) is evaluated here.
- **Field study of economic circulation:** The paper presents community-to-member gas sponsorship as an intended value loop but explicitly notes that whether the engagement returned exceeds the sponsorship cost has not been empirically measured, identifying field studies as future work.
- **Empirical validation of permissionless adoption:** The paper notes that broad adoption across heterogeneous communities has not yet been empirically verified.
- **Decentralized governance of the paymaster layer:** An optional BLS Aggregator is included for future decentralized governance, and the DVT keeper path (three or more independent nodes, aggregated BLS signatures) is presented as a price-feed fallback rather than the primary trust anchor; how far this should be extended to the sponsorship policy itself is left open.

## Target Audience

Researchers and protocol engineers working on account abstraction, paymaster and bundler infrastructure, and gas-payment UX; L2 and OP Stack teams evaluating paymaster designs; wallet and dApp developers deciding between an API-based sponsorship vendor and a self-hosted on-chain design; and HCI-in-Web3 researchers interested in how abstraction choices map onto usability and decentralization trade-offs. Readers wanting only the headline result can read the abstract and Section 5.3 data; readers interested in the design-space argument should read Sections 2.1.3–2.1.4 and 4.5, where rejected design alternatives (transferable ERC-20 vouchers, atomic on-chain swaps at validation time, and off-chain settlement with on-chain fallback) are laid out.

## Authors’ abstract

Most production ERC-4337 Paymasters rely on Process-Oriented Abstraction (POA): a centralized off-chain server signs each sponsorship request, acting as a potential censorship bottleneck. We propose Asset-Oriented Abstraction (AOA), encapsulating payment capability in a persistent, user-owned on-chain asset -- the Gas Card -- rather than an off-chain signing process. Following the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology, we implement SuperPaymaster on Optimism Mainnet,…

[The full abstract on arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.05774)

[Read the original paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.05774)

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Canonical: https://crypto.world/paper/superpaymaster-eliminating-centralized-signer-authority-via-asset-2605.05774
