# Temporary Power Adjusting Withholding Attack

Crypto.world

> In a block withholding attack, an adversary joins a mining pool, submits partial proofs of work (pPoWs) to look productive, but hides the full proofs of work (fPoWs) it finds, while still collecting…

**arXiv**: 2604.14135

**Published**: 2026-04-15

**Authors**: Mustafa Doger, Sennur Ulukus

## AI summary

## Overview

**Research area:** Blockchain security, specifically Proof-of-Work (PoW) mining-pool reward manipulation and stochastic modeling of adversarial mining strategies.

**Technical level:** Advanced. The paper is built on continuous-time stochastic process analysis (exponential block arrivals, incomplete gamma / exponential-integral functions), reward-ratio optimization over three parameters, and familiarity with prior withholding attacks (BWH, FAW, PAW).

**Scope (one sentence):** The paper generalizes the Power Adjusting Withholding (PAW) pool attack by bounding the withholding time to a finite value (T), derives exact revenue expressions, and shows through optimization that the bounded version earns strictly more than PAW for a wide range of parameters.

## What This Paper Is About

In a block withholding attack, an adversary joins a mining pool, submits partial proofs of work (pPoWs) to look productive, but hides the full proofs of work (fPoWs) it finds, while still collecting a share of the rewards earned by the pool's honest members. PAW (Power Adjusting Withholding) refines this by re-allocating the adversary's hashpower toward the target pool once a fPoW is withheld, and it holds that fPoW indefinitely until someone else finds a block. This paper asks whether holding forever is actually the best choice. The authors propose Temporary PAW (T-PAW), in which the adversary releases the withheld fPoW after at most (T) time even if nobody else has mined a block, and they optimize (T) jointly with the two power-allocation fractions.

## Key Contributions

1. **A new attack, T-PAW, that nests existing attacks.** The adversary withholds a pool-mined fPoW for at most (T) time. Setting (T=0) recovers honest mining regardless of the power allocations, and setting (T \to \infty) recovers PAW. The appendices further show how PAW, FAW, and BWH are recovered from T-PAW by specific choices of the fork-race parameter (c), (p_1), (p_2), and (T).
2. **Proof that PAW is not optimal.** The paper shows PAW corresponds to (T \to \infty) and is sub-optimal to T-PAW, with the improvement factor growing without bound as the adversarial hash fraction (\alpha), pool size (\beta), and adversarial network influence (\gamma) decrease.
3. **An exact treatment of pool reward sharing.** The authors replace an approximation used in prior PAW analyses (references [8] and [9]) regarding how fPoW rewards are split among pool members with an exact derivation based on the stochastic distributions of mining times. They state the approximation error grows large especially for T-PAW.
4. **A profitability result that does not depend on difficulty adjustment.** T-PAW is shown to dominate honest mining even with no difficulty adjustment algorithm (DAA), and to produce no profit lag in most parameter regimes even when the objective is revenue-ratio maximization.

## Main Findings

- **Unbounded improvement in the small-parameter regime.** The extra reward of T-PAW over PAW improves by an unbounded factor as (\alpha), (\beta), and (\gamma) decrease. At ((\alpha,\beta,\gamma)=(0.05,0.05,0)), the extra reward of T-PAW is 22 times that of PAW. At (\gamma=0), (\alpha=0.06), (\beta=0.06), the relative extra reward of T-PAW is 15 times that of PAW.
- **Non-trivial short-term gains without any DAA.** For most ((\alpha,\beta)), the adversary gains at least 1% within two weeks in Bitcoin even when (\gamma=0), whereas for PAW the corresponding gain was at most 0.01%. In the revenue-change maximization at (t_1) with (\gamma=0), T-PAW always yields a positive revenue change of more than 0.1%, and inside the marked region the gain exceeds 1%; the PAW case only has a no-profit-lag region below a boundary line, with less than 0.01% gain.
- **The adversary, not the outsiders, benefits most.** Prior work showed that in PAW honest miners outside the target pool often profit more than the attacker, especially at low (\gamma). In T-PAW, even when (\gamma=0), the adversary benefits most from the attack. The paper also proves the general bound (\rho_{rest} \ge 1-\alpha-\beta), so non-pool miners never lose revenue share.
- **A structural boundary in the optimal strategy.** Numerical optimization reveals a diagonal boundary. Above it, (\lambda_1 T^{\ddagger} \approx \infty) and (p_1^{\dagger}=p_1^{\ddagger}), (p_2^{\dagger}=p_2^{\ddagger}), meaning optimal T-PAW collapses to PAW. Below it, (\lambda_1 T^{\ddagger} < 1) and (p_2^{\ddagger}=1): the adversary withholds only briefly and fully commits its power to the pool, because it knows the fPoW will be shared soon. Inside that region (\lambda_1 T^{\ddagger}) increases monotonically with (\beta).
- **Intuition for why finite withholding wins.** Exponential arrivals are memoryless, so the time until someone else mines does not depend on how long the fPoW has been held. But the adversary's *reward* from that fPoW is not memoryless: its fractional contribution saturates over time while its exposure to losing the fork race keeps growing, particularly when (\gamma) is small.
- **Fork-race influence drives the optimal (T).** Across 5 tested ((\alpha,\beta)) cases, optimization gives (p_2^{\ddagger}=1) for all (\gamma), whereas PAW's (p_2^{\dagger}=1) only at high (\gamma). (\lambda_1 T^{\ddagger}) increases monotonically with (\gamma), and as (\gamma \to 1), T-PAW reduces to PAW. Small ((\alpha,\beta)) with low (\gamma) gives more than a 20-fold improvement in relative extra reward.
- **Only the product (\lambda_1 T) matters.** Because all expected reward quantities depend on (\lambda_1 T), scaling the block rate can be absorbed by rescaling (T), which avoids re-solving the optimization after a difficulty adjustment.

## Methodology in Plain English

The authors model the blockchain as a system with a large number of miners, each with a negligible share, where block arrivals follow an exponential distribution with total rate (\lambda_1). A fraction (\alpha) of hashpower is adversarial and colluding; a target pool of honest miners holds fraction (\beta); the analysis assumes (\alpha+\beta<0.5). The adversary splits its power, putting fraction (p_1) into pool mining while waiting for a fPoW, then switching to fraction (p_2) during the withholding phase.

They analyze one "attack cycle" at a time. A cycle can end in five ways: an honest outsider mines a block, the adversary mines individually, a pool member mines, the withheld fPoW triggers a fork race when an outsider mines, or the timer (T) expires and the adversary releases the fPoW anyway. Because cycles are independent, the long-run revenue ratio equals the expected adversarial reward per cycle divided by the expected number of canonical blocks per cycle, and the authors derive closed-form expressions for these expectations, including terms involving the exponential integral (E_1(\cdot)) for the case where the timer expires.

They define three metrics: Relative Extra Rewards (RER), which compares revenue ratios under two strategies; Revenue Change over time, which accounts for block redundancy and difficulty epochs of (D_0) canonical blocks with readjustment (d_n = d_c \tau_0/\tau_c); and Profit Lag, the earliest time after which the strategy always beats honest mining. Since the objective functions are neither convex nor concave in general, they use MATLAB's `fmincon` from at least 100 different initial values of ((p_1,p_2,T)), take the best local maximum, and sweep (\alpha) and (\beta) in increments of (\epsilon = 0.003) for (\gamma \in {0, 0.5}), plus (\gamma) ranging over ([0,1]) for 5 selected ((\alpha,\beta)) pairs.

## Why This Matters

The attack reframes pool mining's security story. Instead of a large attacker exploiting a pool, the paper argues that the pool's own primary participants — small home miners — can individually turn into profitable adversaries with immediate, non-trivial gains. That is a structural weakness in pooled mining rather than a niche parameter corner.

Real-world applications and implications:

- **Pool payout and share-accounting design:** pools that weight rewards by submitted pPoWs are directly exposed, and the analysis shows exactly how a member's optimal withholding window scales with block rate.
- **Countermeasure evaluation:** the paper argues existing defenses are weaker against T-PAW. The timestamp-field proposal of [8] is less effective because the adversary gains even within a limited (T); silent time-stamping [20] can be circumvented by choosing nonce step sizes differently before and during withholding, or by using Sybil identities; the anti-withholding reward system of [19] (paying more for fPoW than pPoW) helps against BWH, FAW, and PAW mainly at low (\gamma) but not against T-PAW, since the adversary usually releases its fPoW before anyone else does.
- **Difficulty adjustment and protocol research:** T-PAW is profitable with no DAA at all, which changes the baseline assumption used to argue that withholding strategies are unprofitable absent difficulty manipulation.
- **Miner economics and pool choice:** small miners can evaluate whether temporary withholding beats honest participation for their own ((\alpha,\beta,\gamma)) region, and pool operators can identify which pool sizes are most vulnerable.

**Industry relevance:** the results apply to any PoW chain using pooled mining with pPoW-based share accounting and epoch-based difficulty retargeting, with Bitcoin used as the concrete reference for the two-week, 1%-gain claim; the historical Eligius incident (300 BTC lost in 2014 after a withholding attack was announced) is cited as precedent that these attacks are not purely theoretical.

## Future Directions

- **Multi-pool analysis.** The paper identifies extending the exact T-PAW model to the competing-pools "prisoner's dilemma" setting studied for FAW/PAW in [7] and [8] as "the most natural and promising future direction," including how T-PAW shifts the parameter regimes where the dilemma holds.
- **Rigorous countermeasure analysis.** The discussion of timestamping, silent time-stamping, Sybil identities, and anti-withholding reward schemes is qualitative; a detailed analysis against each countermeasure is explicitly left to future work.
- **Combining with other attack vectors.** The authors note that eclipse attacks [22], bribery [8, 23, 24], Uncle Block Attack stale-block rewards [21], and high-propagation-delay models [25] could be jointly considered to extend scope and applicability.
- **Non-rational pool managers and richer payout schemes.** The paper assumes a rational pool manager ((\mathbb{1}_{P_R}=1)) and notes the improvements over PAW become even stronger otherwise; share-withholding manipulation of pPoW timing under time-decaying payouts [18] is another open combination, as is handling non-convex objectives more reliably.

## Target Audience

Blockchain security researchers and graduate students working on consensus-layer incentive analysis; mining-pool operators and payout-scheme designers; protocol engineers responsible for difficulty adjustment and stale-block policy; and quantitatively inclined readers who already understand Proof-of-Work, pooled mining, and basic probability but want a rigorous, self-contained treatment of how far withholding attacks can be pushed.

## Authors’ abstract

We consider the block withholding attacks on pools, more specifically the state-of-the-art Power Adjusting Withholding (PAW) attack. We propose a generalization called Temporary PAW (T-PAW) where the adversary withholds a fPoW from pool mining at most $T$-time even when no other block is mined. We show that PAW attack corresponds to $T\to\infty$ and is not optimal. In fact, the extra reward of T-PAW compared to PAW improves by an unbounded factor as adversarial hash fraction…

[The full abstract on arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14135)

[Read the original paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14135)

---

Canonical: https://crypto.world/paper/temporary-power-adjusting-withholding-attack-2604.14135
