Research
Who Swept My ETH? Uncovering EIP-7702-Based Ether Redirection Attacks on Ethereum
Delegating an EOA to a sweeper contract can silently reroute incoming ETH; SweeperHunter's detection method gives wallet teams and auditors a way to scan for exposure.

- arXiv
- 2610.41153
- Published
- 2026-10-30
- Authors
- Ziwei Li, Tianwei Chen, Jiajing Wu, Zigui Jiang, Yuhong Nan, Yaobo Huang, Bowen Song, Zibin Zheng
AI summary
Overview
Research area: Blockchain security, specifically Ethereum account abstraction and the EIP-7702 delegation mechanism.
Technical level: Intermediate. The paper is readable with a basic understanding of Ethereum accounts, transactions, and execution traces, but it assumes familiarity with concepts such as EOAs, contract accounts, calldata, and EVM call traces.
Scope: The first systematic study and large-scale measurement of EIP-7702-based Ether redirection attacks (EERA) on Ethereum mainnet during the first ten months after EIP-7702 activation.
What This Paper Is About
EIP-7702 allows an externally owned account (EOA) to delegate its execution to contract code. Attackers abuse this by delegating victim accounts to malicious “ETH sweeper” contracts that automatically forward incoming ETH, and sometimes the victim’s existing balance, to an attacker-controlled address.
The paper formalizes this attack, proposes a transaction-analysis detector called SweeperHunter, builds the first EERA dataset from Ethereum mainnet activity, and analyzes the attack from both attacker and victim perspectives. The goal is to establish the scale, mechanics, economics, and defensive implications of this new attack paradigm.
Key Contributions
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Threat characterization: The paper presents the first systematic study of EERA and identifies three shifts from conventional asset-draining attacks: passive triggering by third-party transfers, an expanded victim model that includes senders, and persistent monetization from future incoming ETH.
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Empirical dataset: The authors construct SweeperDataset, reporting 4,668,209 malicious delegations, 20,443 attack transactions, and 508 ETH sweeper contracts from Ethereum mainnet activity spanning May 1, 2025 to March 1, 2026.
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Detection framework: SweeperHunter parses EIP-7702 type
0x4transactions, recovers the delegating authority from authorization signatures, builds per-account delegation timelines, and applies five heuristic rules to execution traces to identify redirection behavior. -
Ecosystem analysis and disclosure: The paper analyzes attacker costs and profits, sweeper contract implementations, fund destinations, victim scale, and victim responses, and reports labels, findings, and mitigation recommendations to GoPlus and Chainabuse.
Main Findings
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EERA dominates observed delegations: Of 6,680,498 valid delegations, 4,668,209 are malicious delegations to ETH sweeper contracts, representing 69.88% of all delegations, or approximately 70%.
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Attack activity and profit: The authors identify 20,443 attack transactions and 508 sweeper contracts. Attackers realized a total profit of 122.98 ETH, against costs of 48.14 ETH in delegation fees involving 641,379 delegation transactions and 0.47 ETH in contract deployment fees.
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Rapid delegation growth: Cumulative EIP-7702 delegations rose from 200,521 in May 2025 to more than 6.68 million by February 2026, a 33-fold increase in ten months. By late February 2026, over 1.85 million EOAs had executed more than 6.68 million delegations.
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October 2025 surge: October 2025 recorded 286,059 valid delegation transactions containing 3,512,603 valid delegations, averaging 12 delegations per transaction. Malicious delegations accounted for at least 78.92% of these authorizations, and 81,545 malicious delegation transactions in October contained 3,281,091 malicious delegations, or 70.29% of all malicious delegations.
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Exploitation of leaked private keys: Cross-referencing with the compromised-key repository of Shao et al., 4,050 of 4,189 reported leaked addresses (96.7%) were targeted during the October spike, generating 250,520 malicious delegations. Of these, 99.2% (248,598) were bundled inside batched delegation transactions.
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Two sweeper designs: Manual review of the 508 contracts found 271 using
msg.value-based sweeping, which redirects only ETH received in the current transaction, and 236 usingthis.balance-based sweeping, which also captures the victim’s pre-existing balance. -
Concentration of stolen funds: The paper identifies 362 distinct redirection target addresses. Nineteen targets swept more than 1 ETH each and account for over 86.42% of total stolen ETH. 5,350 transactions (26.2%) redirect ETH to
0xe6c9...1c8b, and 2,235 transactions (10.9%) redirect to0x77dd...350d. Forty different sweeper contracts redirect to0xe6c9...1c8b. -
Victim exposure and inaction: A total of 5,745 distinct victims had ETH swept. Separately, 607,694 unique accounts delegated to the detected sweeper contracts, and the paper reports that over 600,000 accounts failed to revoke or update their malicious delegations promptly, remaining vulnerable.
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Deployer and code-reuse patterns: The 508 contracts correspond to 330 distinct deployer addresses. Two addresses,
0xa6e6...afeaand0xcc59...aa52, each created 8 sweeper contracts. Deployment peaked at 11 contracts on September 19, with 6 created by one address,0x26fd...28ce. The contracts show high decompiled-code similarity, differing mainly in parameters such as the redirection target. -
Top-contract concentration: Seven of the top ten contracts by delegation volume are ETH sweeper contracts, and more than 3.74 million distinct addresses had delegated to these seven contracts.
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Detection validation: Three blockchain security experts unanimously confirmed that all 508 contracts implement malicious ETH sweeping. Forty-two contracts are explicitly labeled by WinterMute as EIP-7702-related crime contracts, and none are categorized as benign services. A stratified sample of 508 transactions, one per contract, was independently audited and all were confirmed as EERA instances; the authors report no observed false positives.
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Validation-campaign peak: On February 14, 2026, 462 of the 500 attacks that day were initiated by a single account,
0x2840...8057, within 9 hours, targeting 286 victim addresses. The campaign transferred less than 0.0015 ETH in total, which the authors conjecture reflects validation of previously deployed malicious delegations. -
Real-world case: One aggregation address conducted 194 attack transactions and stole more than $2,800 worth of ETH from multiple victims.
Methodology in Plain English
The researchers collected Ethereum mainnet transaction metadata and execution traces using the BlockchainSpider tool, covering May 1, 2025 to March 1, 2026.
To identify EIP-7702 delegations, they looked for transactions of type 0x4. Each such transaction contains an authorization list with the delegated contract address and signature components but not the delegating account itself. The authors reconstruct the authorization message hash from the chain ID, delegated address, and nonce, then use ecrecover with the signature to derive the authority address. They verify that the delegation actually took effect by checking whether the authority’s account code begins with 0xef0100 followed by the delegated contract address. Invalid delegations are discarded.
For each authority, they build a chronological mapping of delegation timestamps to delegated contracts, with 0x0 representing revocation. This lets them determine whether an account was in an active delegated state at the time of any transaction.
Detection then relies on five heuristic rules applied jointly:
- The transaction has non-zero value and empty calldata, indicating a plain ETH transfer to the recipient rather than a contract function call.
- The execution trace contains a non-zero ETH transfer triggered during contract execution.
- The transaction recipient was in an active delegated state at that timestamp.
- The traced transfer originates from the transaction recipient.
- The traced transfer destination is neither the transaction sender nor the recipient, indicating redirection to an unrelated account.
A transaction satisfying all conditions is flagged as a suspected EERA attack. The authors validated results by decompiling all 508 contracts with Dedaub and having three experts review them, then sampling one transaction per contract for manual trace analysis.
Why This Matters
Impact on research: The paper defines a new attack class that arises directly from protocol evolution rather than from application bugs. It provides a formal attack model, a reusable detection methodology, and the first measurement baseline for EERA, which can support future work on EIP-7702 security, account abstraction, and on-chain threat detection.
Real-world applications:
- Wallet safety: Wallet providers can warn users before signing EIP-7702 delegations to suspicious contracts, or prompt users to revoke delegations already flagged as malicious.
- Blockchain analytics and labeling: Security firms and block explorers can label sweeper contracts, deployer addresses, and redirection targets, and monitor for the templated code patterns the paper identifies.
- Transaction screening: Payment processors, payroll systems, and treasuries can check whether a recipient EOA is in a delegated state before sending ETH, reducing the risk that funds are immediately swept.
- Incident response and fund tracing: Investigators can use the delegation timeline mapping and redirection-target analysis to trace stolen ETH and identify linked campaigns.
Industry relevance: EIP-7702 is supported by major wallet providers including MetaMask and Trust Wallet, and the paper’s top-ten delegation table includes both identified sweeper contracts and legitimate wallet-related contracts such as Trust Wallet, MetaMask, and Ambire. This mixture shows that malicious and benign delegation activity coexist in the same ecosystem. The authors also report positive feedback from GoPlus after sharing their labels and findings, indicating direct operational value for security vendors.
Future Directions
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Extend detection beyond native ETH: The paper explicitly excludes ERC-20 and other non-native token sweeping from SweeperHunter’s scope because those transfers involve external contract calls and different execution traces. Adapting the approach to token redirection is a clear next step.
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Cross-chain analysis: EIP-7702 applies to major EVM-compatible chains, but this study focuses on Ethereum mainnet. Measuring whether the same sweeper contracts, deployers, and redirection targets appear on other EVM chains would test how widespread the attack ecosystem is.
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Real-time prevention and revocation: The finding that over 600,000 accounts failed to revoke malicious delegations promptly points to a need for better wallet UX, automated revocation alerts, and protocol- or wallet-level safeguards at the point of delegation.
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Template and code-similarity detection: The observed code reuse among sweeper contracts and the use of setter functions for adaptive redirection suggest that similarity-based contract detection and tracking of redirection-target changes could improve automated defense.
Target Audience
This paper is most useful to blockchain security researchers, wallet and infrastructure engineers implementing or supporting EIP-7702, exchange compliance and blockchain analytics teams, incident responders tracing stolen ETH, and protocol designers working on account abstraction. It is also relevant to advanced Ethereum users and auditors who want to understand the risks of delegation-based account behavior. Readers without prior exposure to Ethereum accounts and transaction traces will need background reading first.
Authors’ abstract
EIP-7702 introduces a new transaction type that allows Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) on major EVM-compatible chains to delegate execution to arbitrary contract codes temporarily. While enhancing functionality, this mechanism facilitates a novel threat: the \underline{E}IP-7702-Based \underline{E}ther \underline{R}edirection \underline{A}ttack (EERA). In such an attack, a victim is delegated to a malicious sweeper contract, which automatically redirects incoming ETH…
The full abstract on arXiv