The Ledger
Delving Bitcoin post sets out options for recovering unmigrated coins after a quantum break
A Delving Bitcoin post outlines ways Bitcoin might add recovery conditions for existing coins if elliptic-curve security fails. It weighs recovery secrets, staged spending rules and multisig trade-offs, presenting the ideas for discussion rather than as an adopted change.

A framework for coins that have not migrated
A Bitcoin recovery proposal published Nov. 20 on Delving Bitcoin would add spending conditions to existing unspent transaction outputs if elliptic-curve security were broken. The post’s author, adiabat, focuses mainly on “unprepared” recovery: a route for users who have taken no steps before a quantum computer capable of breaking that security exists.
The post distinguishes this from “prepared” recovery, which would require users to act or commit data before that point. It says prepared schemes overlap with designing new output types, while unprepared recovery could be considered independently of which post-quantum output type Bitcoin chooses. The author presents the ideas as material for reference, feedback and discussion.
Two kinds of recovery secret
The proposal divides possible recovery information into “accidental” and “essential” secrets. Accidental secrets are data that could be made public without giving up control of coins while elliptic-curve security holds, but that may not have been made public. Examples in the post include public keys and scripts hidden behind hashed output types such as P2PKH, P2WPKH, P2SH and P2WSH.
Essential secrets, by contrast, currently give their holder control of the coins. The post identifies a BIP32 seed and the derivation path to a private key as the most common example for recovery, and also mentions brainwallet passphrases and other preimages of private scalars. It says the secret most often used today—the elliptic-curve private key—would be susceptible to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.
The post separates the secret used from the method for using it to move coins to a new output type. It points to commit/reveal methods, including Dropkick and Lifeboat, and zero-knowledge-proof methods that do not disclose the recovery secret. It also mentions Shrinc-ray as a commit/reveal approach, while noting that the choice of secret and recovery method can often be mixed and matched.
Theft versus losing access
The author describes a conflict between preventing theft and avoiding the loss of coins. Requiring an essential secret could leave some coins unspendable, the post says, because BIP32 was written in 2012 and requiring its derivation for UTXOs from 2009–2011 would make those outputs unspendable. Even for more recent outputs, BIP32 is not required, and the post says there is no way to determine whether an output was created using that derivation.
Using accidental secrets avoids that particular obstacle but could expose coins to theft. The post notes that public keys or scripts may have been shared outside the blockchain—for example, when a client shares an extended public key with a server to track incoming transactions. It also points out that when an address has been reused, the public key is visible on-chain, so anyone could provide that accidental secret during recovery.
For coins that recovery methods can reach, the trade-off is whether to protect against theft at the risk of destroying some coins, or protect against destruction while allowing some coins to be stolen. The post says neither using whichever secret is available nor requiring both types resolves the tension: its analysis treats those options as equivalent to relying on accidental or essential secrets alone, respectively.
Possible timing rules and multisig
One suggested compromise would require essential-secret proofs from “Q-day” through Q-day plus two years, then allow accidental secrets. In the post’s example, that would give people with essential secrets time to move coins before accidental secrets could be used, while users who had only accidental secrets would wait two years to recover theirs.
The post also suggests making the requirement depend on how long a UTXO has remained unspent, rather than setting fixed eras. It says older, unmoved outputs might receive a longer period under an essential-secret requirement, while acknowledging that the timing rule is a proposal rather than a settled design.
Multisig adds another complication because its scripts are shared among signers. The post says requiring accidental secrets for a 2-of-3 P2WSH script could effectively make it 1-of-3 if all signers could provide the script; relying on essential secrets instead could increase the risk of destroying coins. It leaves open whether recovery should favor protection from unrelated parties or from a multisig co-signer.
Sources
- Original source Delving Bitcoin delvingbitcoin.org
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