The Ledger
Researchers propose DEX approvals before consensus
A paper introduces FirstSwap, a DEX design that would give traders pre-approval before consensus and set final trade order by limit prices. Its authors report model results for gradual and abrupt price changes and describe a validator protocol intended to make approved trades jointly admissible.

Approvals before finalization
A paper submitted to arXiv on Nov. 6 proposes FirstSwap, a decentralized-exchange design that would approve trades before consensus and guarantee execution within traders’ submitted price limits. The authors are William Diamond, Fatima Elsheimy, Dahlia Malkhi, Geoff Ramseyer and Srivatsan Sridhar.
The work presents FirstSwap as a design, not as a report of a deployed exchange. It describes the system as a decentralized exchange built around a constant-function market-maker pricing curve.
The authors frame the proposal around the period before a block is finalized. They say decentralized exchanges typically provide no execution guarantee during that interval, while external prices can change, traders may delay submission strategically, and block producers can influence which trades are included and how they are ordered.
Under FirstSwap, a trader would receive an early approval before consensus, with inclusion and execution guaranteed within the submitted price limit, according to the paper. Final trade ordering would be determined by limit prices rather than by a block producer.
Model results across price moves
The authors assess pre-approvals in an economic model that combines auction theory with arbitrage between centralized and decentralized exchanges. They compare FirstSwap with a batch auction when the centralized-exchange price changes gradually, and with fair ordering when that price jumps abruptly.
In the gradual-change scenario, the model finds that FirstSwap rewards earlier traders with better prices and discourages strategic delay. The authors also report higher social welfare and gains for automated market-maker liquidity providers than in the batch-auction comparison.
When the centralized-exchange price jumps abruptly, the paper reports higher welfare and smaller automated market-maker losses under FirstSwap than under fair ordering. These are findings from the paper’s economic model, rather than reported results from a live exchange.
Validator protocol
The authors identify fast approvals without consensus as the main protocol challenge. Their proposed decentralized, scaled admissibility protocol has each validator reserve only a fraction of the available liquidity at every price.
A trader would obtain approval in a single round of messages with a quorum of validators. The paper says all quorum-certified trades would remain jointly admissible and execute within their limits even if Byzantine validators approve trades arbitrarily.
The authors also say the protocol can be extended so buy and sell orders are pre-approved against each other before a block is finalized.
Sources
- Original source · Preprint FirstSwap: Pre-Consensus Trade Approvals for Decentralized Market Design arXiv:2611.10254