The Ledger
SlowMist Finds Udesk Script That Can Steal Sessions and Swap Deposits
SlowMist found malicious code in a Udesk-related customer-service script that collects browser data and login submissions. On three site patterns, the payload can replace crypto deposit addresses and alter clipboard contents.

“Removing the script tag does not revoke hooks and timers that have already been installed.”
The SlowMist Threat Intelligence team, Threat Intelligence | Udesk Loads Malicious JS to Steal Data and Alter Transfer Addresses
A customer-service script loads a second payload
SlowMist said on October 27 that it found malicious code in a JavaScript file associated with Udesk’s customer-service system. The sample, named udeskApi.2026-10-16.cached.js, adds a loader that decodes a hidden address and asynchronously fetches a second file, deeps.js, from udeskqlobal[.]com. The domain begins with a “q,” not a “g.”
The report describes two distinct risks: collection of webpage data and, on selected sites, replacement of cryptocurrency deposit addresses. SlowMist analyzed two JavaScript samples to trace how the code enters a page and what it does there. Its analysis does not establish how the code was inserted into the Udesk-related script.
Data collection runs beyond the three address targets
SlowMist found that deeps.js reads cookies available to the page, along with localStorage and sessionStorage, and sends the information to udeskqlobal[.]com/c.php. It also hooks form submissions and requests whose URLs include terms such as “login,” “auth,” “register” or “password,” copying submitted content while letting the original request proceed. Cookies marked HttpOnly are not accessible through the script’s cookie-reading method.
The report’s code analysis places those collection steps before a condition that ends the address-manipulation module on sites outside its configured rules. That means the data-collection behavior is not limited to the three site patterns SlowMist names for deposit changes. If usable session tokens or credentials were collected, they could help an attacker impersonate users or access accounts; the report describes that as a risk, not a confirmed outcome.
Address checks run every 200 milliseconds
For matching pages, the script scans every 200 milliseconds for strings that resemble deposit addresses and replaces recognized values with addresses configured in the payload. SlowMist identifies the relevant site patterns as mgbx[.]com, bikingex[.] and bitxex[.]io, and says the code targets BTC, EVM, TRON, Solana, LTC and DOGE addresses. It checks page and address patterns; it does not verify the network selected by a user or validate an address checksum.
The payload also interferes with copying. SlowMist found code that wraps the browser’s clipboard API, replaces matching copy buttons and intercepts copy events. As a result, comparing the displayed address with the copied version may not reveal a substitution: both can show the same altered value. A transfer sent to that replacement address would go to the substituted recipient.
SlowMist urges operators to check live pages and records
SlowMist recommends that operators preserve copies of affected resources and request records, stop serving compromised scripts, and restore versions verified through trusted channels. It also advises investigating outbound traffic to the malicious domain, revoking potentially exposed sessions, and changing tokens and passwords from a clean environment. Deposit addresses, transaction histories and actual transfer destinations should be checked against trusted backend records.
The report does not provide a count of affected sites or confirmed losses. Its technical finding is narrower and more actionable: an open page can retain hooks and timers even after the script tag is removed. SlowMist advises teams to close affected pages or in-app WebViews completely, then verify deposits and credentials before treating the incident as contained.
Sources
- Original source SlowMist slowmist.medium.com
Other pages read
- TechFlow techflowpost.com