The Ledger
zkLink Nova Bridge Exploit Drains About $786,000
An attacker used a forged batch root to withdraw ETH and 11 token types from zkLink Nova’s Ethereum bridge. On-chain records show the withdrawals occurred in one transaction; estimates of the loss vary by source and valuation method.

A forged root opened the withdrawal path
An attacker drained assets from zkLink Nova’s Ethereum bridge on October 28, using a forged batch root to pass withdrawal checks and move funds from escrow. Blockaid, the blockchain security firm that flagged the exploit, described the attack as ongoing in its alert.
“Used a public relayer to inject a forged batch root on Ethereum, then finalized ETH and ERC20 withdrawals from zkLink Nova L1 escrow to attacker-chosen receivers.”
The main withdrawal took place at 22:21:35 UTC, according to the transaction record. Loss estimates vary: Blockaid put the amount at about $786,000, SlowMist estimated near $783,100, and The Defiant calculated $778,625.84 for the single transaction.
How the withdrawal path worked
zkLink Nova is an aggregated Layer 3 network built on Ethereum and its Layer 2 networks. Its Ethereum-side bridge contracts hold deposits and release assets when users withdraw from Nova. The contracts check withdrawal claims against a batch root, a cryptographic summary of transactions. A forged root can make a withdrawal appear authorized even when the corresponding activity did not occur.
SlowMist’s technical analysis identified a vulnerability in the claimMessage function of zkLink Nova’s Arbitrator contract. The function did not clear a temporary value called finalizeMessageHash after use, and did not require a fresh authenticated callback on each call. SlowMist’s account says an attacker used a publicly callable relayer to reuse a valid hash and make a call appear to come from the legitimate Ethereum Gateway.
That sequence allowed the attacker to set a batch root of their choosing, then submit withdrawal proofs matching the forged value. The transaction logs show a new root for batch 116,409 recorded before the withdrawals were finalized. The on-chain record documents the sequence; the explanation of the vulnerability is based on SlowMist’s analysis.
One transaction moved ETH and 11 token types
The transaction withdrew 22.43 ETH from zkLink Nova’s Ethereum contract and 11 types of tokens from its ERC-20 bridge, sending them to one recipient. The largest component was 245.74 pufETH. The transfers also included roughly 18,113 USDC and 3,361 USDT.
The Defiant’s $778,625.84 estimate covers the single transaction and was calculated using Etherscan prices at 10:25 p.m. ET. Blockaid’s estimate was about $786,000, while SlowMist put the loss near $783,100. Those totals reflect differing valuation methods or reporting times rather than one agreed final tally. The Defiant also reported that the affected ETH escrow showed roughly 0.001 ETH remaining after the withdrawal.
The pause flag did not settle the wider risk
The Defiant found the main Ethereum escrow’s pause flag set to false when it checked at 10:29 p.m. ET. That reading did not establish whether other controls had stopped further activity, and Blockaid had described the exploit as ongoing in its alert.
The available reports do not establish that all assets or connected networks were affected. The clearest measured result is the single Ethereum transaction: 22.43 ETH and 11 token types withdrawn from zkLink Nova’s bridge.
Sources
- Original source · Social media post Blockaid x.com
Other pages read
- SlowMist x.com
- Etherscan etherscan.io
- The Defiant thedefiant.io
Related stories
- Initia Exploit Pulled $2.73M From Three Bridge Reserves
- A Negative Fee Drained $90,528 From the WAX Bridge
- Singapore Police Report $3.5M Lost in Tampered Ledger Cases
- Binance Puts $6.3B Security Incident on the Books, Says Users Are Safe
- SlowMist Finds Udesk Script That Can Steal Sessions and Swap Deposits